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ABSTRACT 
Despite Mexico joining NAFTA in 1994, a manufacturing wage gap between 
Mexico and United States production workers continues to remain at a 
considerable extent. Further, it increased as from 2007, systematically measured in 
dollar terms and adjusted by producer prices. While the Stolper-Samuelson and 
the Factor Equalization theorems seem not to hold, additional characteristics are 
analyzed through an error correction model, applied to three continuous and 
consistent pre and post NAFTA time periods. A positive Mexico-United States 
manufacturing output ratio and Mexican real exchange rate depreciations widens 
the wage gap. The manufacturing output ratio growth is found to affect negatively 
the demand for United States production workers. Meanwhile, Mexican hourly 
wages appear as a substitute of United States labor demand, with a coefficient 
approaching an elastic value. Far from any complementariness, wage divergences 
appear to be instrumental for the incidence of Mexican labor in United States 
manufacturing production workers.    
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
In 1990, the Mexican and United States governments, through their presidents, 
announced their determination to enter into a fast-track procedure to sign a free 
trade agreement between their two countries. Mexico became part, along with 
Canada, of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This agreement 
seeks to deregulate trade and capital flows, while giving no consideration to labor 
mobility. It also considers tariff elimination and other trade barriers among the 
United States, Canada, and Mexico over a 15-year period, which is already over. 
Therefore, it is expected that integration has being attained to a considerable 
degree. However, labor flows, Mexican oil -operations under a government 
monopoly and pegging the Mexican peso to the dollar were left out of negotiations. 
Nearly two decades after the NAFTA was implemented in 1994, a labor migration 
reform has not been yet established. 
 
As a result of the above mentioned agreement, it was expected that free trade 
would effectively contribute to reduce any wage gap, as labor is to compete 
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indirectly, i.e. through the price of traded goods. A reduction in the wage gap would 
imply an equalization or convergence in the income of workers. Ever since Mexico 
formally joined NAFTA, the subject of wage convergence has been a recurrent 
topic in the literature. Furthermore, the very NAFTA announcement gave rise to a 
series of debates, considering the asymmetry, in particular between Mexico and 
the United States. For example, NAFTA continues to lead expectations of job 
generation in Mexico, due to prevailing low wage levels and therefore, to the 
cheapening of goods exported to United States. For the Mexican case, great hopes 
of attracting foreign direct investment and capital flows to reduce its chronic 
external deficit still prevail.  
 
This work exclusively envisages manufacturing production and nonsupervisory 
workers. This segment could be considered as the most important one in 
manufacturing, both due to its size as well as to its role and skill conveyed. Its 
relevance is underlined when their higher wages are compared with the 
compensation received by workers in the retail and wholesale sectors, for instance. 
Besides, manufacturing is at the heart of any advanced or emerging economy, 
reflecting its relative strength.  
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No purchasing power adjustment for final demand is made between wages in both 
countries, as it is labor as a factor of production and not its welfare as final 
consumer what is considered here. In other words, the analysis is over product 
wages, and no regarding real wages.1 Meanwhile, the present work concentrates 
itself on the examination of wages as a factor of production.2 
 
Besides, basically all the estimates are done in terms of United States dollars, 
while price adjustments, when required, are carried out using United States 
deflators. In other words, Mexican labor is analyzed regarding its incidence through 
the wage gap, manufacturing output ratio of both countries as well as wage rates, 
on United States manufacturing production workers. It is important to mention that 
                                               
1 Sachs (1983), for instance, correctly distinguishes between product wages and real wages. He 
makes explicit that it explains the trend of the labor cost to the firm.  
2 If a comparison of real wages between both types of manufacturing workers were to be made, a 
totally different approach would have to be followed. This is because there is no common basket of 
goods and services for both groups of workers, as Mexico has its own currency. Therefore, 
purchasing power comparisons would have to be introduced, expressing different costs of such final 
consumption of goods and services for the worker within each country. Such result, as a difference 
to the approach taken in this work, would bring about well-being differentials, for instance, between 
workers in both sides of the border. Nevertheless, the importance of considering a welfare 
differential would suggest the production of a completely different analysis, as it would focus on 
wages from the point of view of final consumption i.e. real wages. 
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only inland manufacturing is taken into account. In consequence, Mexican 
maquiladora workers, devoted to offshore assembly for export are being excluded. 
 
This work is organized as follows: the first chapter introduces the subject including 
a brief outline of the content of this work. In the second chapter, the bilateral wage 
gap among manufacturing production workers is dealt with by descriptive statistics, 
followed by an estimate of this gap, which is made dependent on the bilateral real 
exchange rate and the manufacturing output ratio, between Mexico and United 
States. In addition, the growth rate of the latter ratio is being estimated. In the third 
chapter, an assessment over wage elasticity is performed. In the fourth chapter the 
derived demand for labor, incorporating United States and Mexican wages are 
estimated in terms of employment and the wage bill for the United States, followed 
by the conclusions, which are briefly presented in a fifth and final chapter.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Wage gaps: an unattained convergence  
The analysis for wage convergence could be traced back to the beginning of the 
20th century, regarding factor endowments, free trade and price equalization. Ohlin 
(1967) claimed, alongside Heckscher (1991) who was a pioneer of this concept, 
that production based on comparative advantage is grounded on factor 
proportions, leading to the well-known theorem. Specifically, foreign trade could act 
as a substitute for the flows of labor migration and capital movements. 
 
Afterwards, Samuelson (1948) provides an adequate proof of the factor price 
equalization theorem. Assuming two goods, the same number of factors of 
production and countries, the price of factors would be equalized without the need 
for factor mobility, whether it could be labor migration or capital flows. There are a 
series of restrictive assumptions, which should be borne in mind. 3  Within this 
theorem, the factor remunerated at a lower price, would tend to become more 
                                               
3 That is to say, free trade, no transportation costs, perfect competition, cost minimizing firms, 
constant returns to scale, identical number of production functions and international markets, similar 
technology and prices, for instance. It is important to note that labor homogeneity is assumed in 
terms of hours worked and effort per hour, according to Hamermesh (1993), p. 20. 
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expensive as the two countries trade. At the same time, the factor that is more 
expensive in one of the two countries will tend to lower its price. If this theorem 
holds, it would be expected that manufacturing wages for workers in Mexico would 
rise as a result of NAFTA, while the opposite would be the case for United States. 
It has been claimed that it was Lerner (1952) who first discovered this theorem 
back in 1933. 
 
Further, Stolper and Samuelson (1941) produced what is known as the theorem 
bearing their name, based in turn on the validity of the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) 
theorem. According to Haskel and Slaughter (1998), a version of the SS theorem 
considered that unskilled workers, which produce traded goods in a country where 
high-skills prevail would be worse off, as foreign trade increases. This is because 
unskilled labor is a less abundant factor in a high-skilled labor country, vis-à-vis 
capital, which is abundant. Therefore, it could be deduced that it would not be to 
the advantage of countries like Mexico to produce goods that require a high level of 
skill.  
 
  
7 
Bearing in mind the theoretical framework towards convergence outlined before, an 
attempt to examine the wage gap between both countries is being done. This work 
does not attempt to test the SS theorem. In other words, it is constrained to 
analyze wage convergence. In fact, to test the SS theorem constitutes a work on 
its own. Every reference in the present document regarding FPE is in relation to 
what is to be expected according to the corpus of such theory. Besides, labor is the 
only production factor addressed in this work, leaving totally aside what could 
happen or might have happened to capital, as another factor of production. In this 
respect, this analysis focuses exclusively on the wage gap convergence of labor. 
 
By means of descriptive statistics, three such sets are reported in Table 1. The first 
set describes the behavior for the wage gap; the second set describes United 
States wages, and the third set describes Mexican wages. The purpose of this 
table is to describe the principal trends depicted by these variables. In order to 
have continuous and consistent variable sets, three periods were selected,4 i.e. 
1987-1994; 1995-2006 and 2007-up to date.5  
                                               
4  These three periods were established on the basis of data available for the Mexican 
manufacturing sector for four overlapped periods i.e. 1987-1994; 1994-2008; 2005-2010 and 2007 
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Table 1. Manufacturing Production Workers. United States-Mexico. Gap and Wages. Selected 
periods (Wages at prices of 1982* per hour) 
      
  1987:01-1994:12 1995:01-2006:12 2007:01-2013:02  
1. Gap      
 Mean 0.15 0.14 0.11  
 SD 0.04 0.03 0.01  
 CV 0.29 0.23 0.12  
      
2. United States     
 Mean 9.26 10.41 10.17  
 SD 0.18 0.45 0.31  
 CV 0.02 0.04 0.03  
      
3. Mexico      
 Mean 1.41 1.51 1.11  
 SD 0.43 0.40 0.14  
 CV 0.30 0.26 0.12  
      
 n 96 144 74  
      
* Adjusted for inflation by the producer price index (finished goods), not seasonally adjusted (nsa). 
Note: SD stands for standard deviation and CV for coefficient of variation. 
Source: Own estimates based on Banco de Mexico, Bureau of Labor Statistics and Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica y Geografia. 
 
In Table 1, Mexican wages are being converted to United States currency in order 
to make them comparable to United States wages. Besides, United States and 
Mexican wages are adjusted for inflation through producer price indexes. As a 
result, wages are measured throughout time from the firm point of view, that is to 
                                                                                                                                               
up to date on a monthly basis. It was judged convenient to establish a pre NAFTA period, while the 
last post NAFTA period comprises in full the recent economic recession. 
5 The same sectors of economic activity that appear in the first period, were maintained with the two 
following ones, in order to make the three periods consistent in terms of the number of sectors of 
industrial activities analyzed (see Appendix 6). 
  
9 
say, as product wages. Hence, the wage gap represents the fraction of the 
average Mexican wage compared to its counterpart in the United States.6 
 
For the first two periods, comprising 1987 to 1994 and 1995 to 2006 on a monthly 
basis, the wage gap has remained basically without change. That is to say, 
Mexican wages amounted to around one seventh of United States wages. 7 
However for the last period, i.e. 2007 to date, the mean wage gap grew to over one 
tenth, widening the difference between Mexican and United States wage.8 
 
The behavior of United States wages throughout time is basically stable with a 
reported mean of 9.26; 10.41 and 10.17 dollars of 1982 per hour. This stability is 
also displayed by the coefficient of variation (CV) with values of 0.02; 0.04 and 
                                               
6 By using a producer price index (PPI) as a proxy for a gross value added deflator, a product wage 
is being estimated. 
7 As for the two periods mentioned above, a mean value of 0.15, and 0.14 is found respectively. 
Here, the wage gap is the ratio of Mexico and United States manufacturing hourly wages. A unit 
ratio would be an absence of gap, while a value towards zero would convey an increasing gap. 
8 In consequence, the debate between exporting goods or people to the United States claimed by 
Blecker and Esquivel (2009) does not seem to apply, as a widening wage gap could induce both, 
and not the first at the expense of the second. 
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0.03 for 1987-1994; 1995-2006 and 2007-up to date, respectively. This CV stability 
goes alongside with a modest wage growth rate. 
 
Meanwhile, for the periods 1987-1994; 1995-2006 and 2007-up to date the 
Mexican wage shows a greater variation, though a diminishing CV of 0.30; 0.26 
and 0.12, respectively.9 The Mexican mean exposes values of 1.41; 1.51 and 1.11 
dollars of 1982 per hour, for each of the subsequent periods. As a result, the fall of 
the Mexican average wage in terms of United States currency appears to be 
coincident with the enlargement of the wage gap. Besides, the reduction of the 
dispersion, in particular during the last period seems to be associated with the 
wage contraction that production wages experienced in Mexico, suggesting a fall in 
the wage differentials among skills. 
 
From the above Table 1, United States CV exposes stability along with a modest 
wage growth rate. For its part, Mexican CV shows considerable fluctuations and a 
subsiding rate of increase. In this respect, Gandolfi, Halliday and Robertson (2014) 
                                               
9 Esquivel and Rodriguez (2003) address the time period between 1988 and 1994, finding that trade 
liberalization has reduced the wage dispersion in Mexico, i.e. when compared with the pre-NAFTA 
period. However, no explanation for this reduction is provided. 
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find that for a US-Mexico integrated economy the variance of log wages has 
declined due to reductions in variation in wages across education/age cohorts.10 
These authors conclude that the data seem to suggest that Mexican wage 
dispersion has decreased and that United States wage inequality has steadily 
increased.11 
 
In Figure 1, the evolution of the wage gap through time is presented. The mean of 
the wage gap,12 belong to the range plotted for each period. In Mexico every 
December, there is a statutory annual bonus.13 As a result, the wage gap appears 
to be reduced during the last month of the year. 
 
 
 
                                               
10 “Similarly, we also show that in the US-Mexico integrated economy the variance of log wages has 
declined and that this is due to reductions in variation in wages across education/age cohorts…” 
11 “In summary, the data seem to suggest that Mexican wage dispersion has decreased and that 
American inequality has done the opposite but that this is not consistent with a textbook HOS story.” 
The time evolution of log wages in the integrated economy is depicted in Table 5 of Galdolfi et al. 
(2014). 
12 Table 1. 
13 Locally known as aguinaldo, which legally corresponds to a bonus amounting two weeks of 
wages. 
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The fall in dispersion, particularly during the last period, as well as the increase in 
the wage gap are confirmed by looking at Figure 1. The wage gap is considerably 
influenced by the Mexican inflation and the peso dollar exchange rate. These 
elements are considered in Appendix 7. 
 
Returning to the wage gap results mentioned above and its relation with some 
literature, Calderon (2006) while resorting to descriptive statistics argues that the 
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Figure	1.	United	States-Mexico.	Wage	Gap	between	Manufacturing	Produc on	Workers	
Selected	Periods	(Dollars)	
1987:01-1994:12	 1995:01-2006:12	 2007:01-2013:12	
Source: Own estimates based on Banco de Mexico, Bureau of Labor Statistics and Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia. 
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real wage gap between Mexico and United States has been widening, by 
increasing to an equivalent of 0.10 in 1993, to reach over 0.08 in 2002. 14 
Lederman, Maloney and Serven (2005, p.5) concluded that NAFTA does not 
suffice to ensure economic convergence in North America.  
 
It is conceded that per-capita GDP (Gross Domestic Product) of other Latin 
American and Caribbean countries has evolved more favorably than in Mexico, 
despite the fact that they did not enter into a trade agreement with United States. 
The difficulties for convergence as far as per-capita GDP is concerned, are 
expected to remain in the long-term, as the just above mentioned authors envisage 
institutional gaps, as well as deficiencies in public policies regarding i.e. education 
and innovation in Mexico. 
 
Polaski (2004), for example, reaches similar conclusions by finding that Mexican 
wages are diverging, rather than converging with the ones in United States. These 
                                               
14 In so far as the author estimates the wage gap as a ratio between United States and Mexico, the 
figures that he produced are 9.6 in 1993, and 12 in 2002. When estimated the other way around, 
i.e. the ratio between Mexico and United States wages, the figures of 0.10 and 0.08 are obtained, 
which are the ones reported in the present work.  
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findings are endorsed, inter alia by Deva and Sonderfors (2008). In analyzing the 
real wages ratio between Mexico and United States, by means of a linear 
regression without stationary variables, these authors conclude that the speed of 
wage convergence, which took place after NAFTA is below the one achieved 
before the agreement was established.  
 
Gandolfi et al. (2014), resorting to the foundations of neoclassical trade theory, 
endorse the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS), predicting convergence on the 
price of goods and factors. However, these authors report a lack of convergence 
for the time period of 1988 to 2011.15  
 
Hanson (2003) finds that there is little evidence on wage convergence between 
both countries. He reaches this conclusion by analyzing the 1990 and 2000 
population censuses. In examining the sensitivity of Mexican wages to wage 
changes in United States, after controlling for education, Hanson found no 
significant effect in Mexico vis-à-vis United States wages.  
                                               
15  Regarding future tasks, an applied general equilibrium model to generate direct predictions 
related to NAFTA and income convergence is needed, according to these authors. 
  
15 
 
The empirical evidence for wage convergence seems to wince when Feenstra and 
Hanson (2003) report that according to their results, it appears that international 
trade helps in increasing the skilled-unskilled wage gap. 
 
Robertson (2005a), uses the United States Current Population Survey (CPS) 
National, and its Mexican counterpart, the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano 
(ENEU). Through an error correction approach, an assessment of NAFTA labor 
market integration between United States and Mexico is accomplished. In this 
purpose, he classified wages according to age, and educational groups in four key 
border locations constrained to maquiladora activity,16 besides Mexico City. This 
author used three measuring approaches: absolute wage convergence, response 
of Mexican wages to United States wage shocks, and the rate of convergence 
between United States and Mexican wages. He finds that Mexican and United 
States wages expose a long-term relationship, i.e. they cointegrate. However, he 
also reported little evidence of increased integration in NAFTA labor market. 
                                               
16 Tijuana, Ciudad Juárez, Matamoros and Nuevo Laredo. According to Hanson (2003), around four 
fifths of maquiladora output is concentrated in three types of goods: apparel, electronics and car 
parts. 
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As a continuation of his 2005 wage convergence analysis, Robertson (2005b) 
assumes that if there is a NAFTA labor market integration, wage shocks could be 
transmitted from one region to the other one. In order to achieve integration, he 
says, a long-term wage equilibrium differential should be shrinking between United 
States and Mexico. However, he reports that the difference between wages in both 
countries is constant, returning to such long-term wage equilibrium differential 
whenever they deviate from it. As a result, this author concludes that neither a 
convergence nor a divergence in terms of long-term wage equilibrium differential is 
being reached. 
 
Through a different procedure, Hanson (2003) analyzed the wage structure in 
Mexico, going as far back as the 80’s, when the liberalization process of the 
Mexican economy started. Specifically, this author examines 1986, when Mexico 
joined the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). He found that wages 
and demand for skilled workers have risen, as they mirror closely labor wage 
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fluctuations in United States.17 At the same time, he noted that regional wage 
differential among countries have grown. He believes that this effect is due to 
heterogeneous access to foreign investment, trade and migration opportunities.  
 
Afterwards, Hanson (2004) examines the impact of free trade (NAFTA) in the 
Mexican labor market. He finds that a greater wage premium is presented in the 
Mexican border regions vis-à-vis the Mexican south. As a consequence, he reports 
little wage convergence across labor market groups during the 90’s at this 
geographical level. He employs data from the 1990 and 2000 population censuses 
and synthetic cohorts.  
 
As an exception to the findings mentioned previously, Esquivel and Rodriguez 
(2003), explicitly claim that they found grounds to confirm the SS theorem. 
However, they argue that this wage effect was offset by the sizable negative 
impact of technological progress on the real wage of unskilled workers. For the 
                                               
17 Hanson finds that Mexican interior wages rise 1.8%, while Mexican border city wages increase 
2.5%. Both increases were the result of a shock coming from United States, where wages 
increased by 10%.   
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period 1994-2000, these authors did not find a wage divergence effect, suggesting 
that even a slight increase in wage inequality was the result of technical progress.  
 
Robertson (2004) finds that prices explain wage inequality in line with the SS 
theorem. For this purpose, he constructs two sets of price indexes: Laspeyres and 
Paasche. This author finds that changes in relative good prices are connected to 
changes in relative wages, a link that emerges in a period of three to five years. 
 
2.1 Wage gaps: determinants  
An estimate is done in order to find out which factors contribute to determining a 
growing wage gap. 18  The Mexico-United States wage gap in dollar terms is 
presented as a function of a bilateral real exchange index and the manufacturing 
output ratio. In brief, the existing wage gap between Mexican and United States 
production workers is assumed to be determined, on the one hand, by the degree 
                                               
18  In searching for adequate variables determining the wage gap, several inroads have been 
examined. Initially, the inclusion of years of education and training (“human capital”) was 
considered. However, the frequency for which data is available (annual) rendered them inadequate. 
On the other hand, unemployment rates were found to be without significance, as the shadow 
economy in Mexico, besides being sizable provides recurrent opportunities for local labor, 
weakening the relevance of this variable. 
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of appreciation of the Mexican currency vis-à-vis the dollar. On the other hand, 
such gap is to be determined by the manufacturing output ratio of both countries 
i.e., Mexico and the United States.   
 
(1) 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥
𝑖
ℎ𝑚𝑥
𝑖
𝐸𝑜
𝑤𝑢𝑠
𝑖
)
 
𝑡
 =  𝑐𝑡 +  𝛼 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐)𝑡−𝑗  +  𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥
𝑖
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠
𝑖  
)
𝑡−𝑗
 +
 𝜀𝑡. 
 
where 𝑊𝑚𝑥
𝑖  is the wage bill or payroll for Mexican manufacturing production 
workers; ℎ𝑚𝑥
𝑖  is the number of hours of manufacturing production workers for the 
Mexican manufacturing industry; 𝐸𝑜 is the nominal exchange rate, i.e. pesos per 
dollar; 𝑤𝑢𝑠
𝑖  is the United States average hourly earnings of manufacturing 
production and nonsupervisory workers; 𝐸𝑟𝑐 is the Mexican bilateral real exchange 
rate computed with consumer prices;19 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥
𝑖  is the manufacturing production 
                                               
19 In Appendix 1 (Relation of variables and sources), a full definition is provided for these variables 
as well as for the rest that are being used throughout this work. The differences between 𝐸𝑜 and 
𝐸𝑟𝑐, is that the former measures the local currency value inside of a country, while the second 
expresses the relationship between the consumer prices of one country with respect to the other 
country. The Mexican and United States inflations are linked by their corresponding nominal 
exchange rate, which serves as a vehicle to compare both inflations. 
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index for Mexico in local currency;20 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠
𝑖  is the manufacturing production index, 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) for United States 
expressed in local currency; while 𝜀 stands for the error term. The superscript 𝑖 
refers to 𝑖 = 1, 2  and 3 , expressing the time period under consideration, 𝑖 = 1 
covers from January of 1987 to December of 1994; 𝑖 = 2 stands for January of 
1995 to December of 2006; 𝑖 = 3 considers from January of 2007 to February of 
2013. The subscript 𝑡 refers to the current period of time; 𝑗 refers to time lags, 
where 𝑗 = 1, 2,… , 𝑛.21  
 
For the above equation (1), a positive coefficient of the Mexican bilateral real 
exchange rate with respect to the wage gap is expected. That is to say, an 
appreciation of the Mexican peso would convey a reduction of the wage gap. 
Certainly, this reduction implies that wages become closer between both countries. 
                                               
20 ‘‘The production index measures real output and is expressed as a percentage of real output in a 
base year.’’ Retrieved from http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/about.htm. The nominal 
manufacturing output in its current currency is deflated to obtain the real output and later it is 
converted to an index with weights based on annual estimates of value added. The manufacturing 
output index is computed in its correspondent statistical offices, either in Mexico or United States. 
Thus, United States manufacturing output index is in dollars and the Mexican one is in pesos. 
21 Then, 𝑗  is the lag of the independent variable necessary to obtain a better adjustment with 
respect to the dependent variable. 
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If the SS and FPE theorems hold, a contraction in the wage gap is expected. Thus, 
the effect of manufacturing output over the wage gap is assumed to be positive. 
Regarding the index of manufacturing output ratio, a negative coefficient is 
expected. That is to say, the larger the manufacturing output growth in Mexico, a 
higher wage gap should be observed. This is in so far as a relative manufacturing 
output growth in Mexico would rebound in a wider gap between the wages of both 
countries, suggesting a relative lowering of Mexican wages.   
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Table 2. Manufacturing Production Workers. Elasticity of the Wage Gap with respect to Mexican 
Real Exchange Rate and Manufacturing Output Index Ratio. Monthly frequency. Selected periods 
      
   Dependent variable: Mexico-United States wage gap 
  1987:01-1994:12  1995:01-2006:12  2007:01-2013:02 
Independent      
variables:      
Mexican real exchange rate*     
 Long-term 1.56  1.44  0.93 
  lag t-1     
 Short-term 1.67  0.79  1.07 
  lag t-1     
        
Manufacturing output index ratio**     
 Long-term -0.93  -0.69  -0.66 
  lag t-2    t-3 
 Short-term -1.56  -0.68  -0.78 
  lag t-2    t-3 
        
  n 96  144  72 
        
* Bilateral Mexico-United States, on the basis of consumer price indexes. 
** Mexican manufacturing production index in relation with the U.S. one, each adjusted for inflation with local 
implicit price indexes. 
Note 1: All reported estimates are significant at a 99%, as reported on Appendix 2.1. 
Note 2: The 1995:01-2006:12 time period includes a dummy variable for the last month of December 
(intercept), due to a statutory annual bonus payment (aguinaldo). 
Source: Appendix 2.1. 
 
Ostensible long-term elasticity coefficients are obtained for the wage gap with 
respect to the Mexican real exchange rate for the pre NAFTA period, i.e. 1987-
1994 and in the first post NAFTA period, i.e. 1995-2006 (1.56 22  and 1.44, 
respectively). During the current period the respective coefficient is slightly reduced 
below the unit value (0.93). The short-term elasticity coefficient is above the unit 
                                               
22 With one month lag. 
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value (1.67)23 for 1987-1994. After falling below a unit value (0.79) in the first post 
NAFTA period (1995-2006), it exposes an almost unit value (1.07) for the current 
period (2007-up to date). 
 
As a result, the bilateral real exchange rate becomes a most important variable to 
influence the wage gap. At the same time, a reduction of this gap would require an 
appreciation of the Mexican peso, which in turn lies outside the domain of labor 
markets.  
 
In the long-term, the elasticity of the wage gap with respect to the ratio of Mexico-
United States manufacturing index is elastic and negative in the pre NAFTA period 
(-0.93),24 i.e. 1987-1994. While its value tends to be reduced once NAFTA is in 
place (-0.69 and -0.6625), nonetheless it remains negative and close to being 
elastic. In the short-term, the coefficients are similar for the first post NAFTA period 
(-0.68) i.e., 1995-2006, as well as for the current period (-0.78)26 i.e., 2007 to date. 
                                               
23 Lagged one period. 
24 With two months lags. 
25 Lagged three periods. 
26 With three months lags. 
  
24 
During the pre NAFTA period i.e., 1987-1994 the short-term coefficient reaches the 
highest value (-1.56).27 Given the negative sign expressed in these coefficients, a 
negative relationship is established for these variables. For instance, an increase in 
the manufacturing output ratio of Mexico-United States would decrease the 
Mexican-United States wage gap. In other words, a rise in the rhythm of Mexican 
manufacturing output in relation to the one for United States would derive a greater 
wage gap. In the next section, the growth rate of manufacturing output ratio is to be 
measured. This is in order to confirm whether such quotient has been growing. If 
this is the case, the results from equation 1 and reported in Table 2, would be 
consistent with Table 1, where the wage gap exposes a systematic growth through 
time.   
 
2.1.1 An examination of selected tradable sectors  
The above equation (1) considers both manufacturing output index ratio and wages 
in an aggregate fashion. However, it is of interest to consider how specific tradable 
sectors behave in Mexican manufacturing, while using the functional form 
previously expressed in equation (1). For this purpose, three tradable sectors are 
                                               
27 Lagged two periods. 
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being selected i.e., primary metals, machinery and transport equipment. The 
relevance of these sectors is attested in so far as they represented 81.7 % of the 
total manufacturing exports in 2012.28 For convenience, the results are reported in 
Table 2.A with respect to the Mexican real exchange rate and in Table 2.B 
regarding the manufacturing output index ratio, as follows:  
  
                                               
28 This trade percentage is computed using the Mexican Balance of Payments for manufacturing 
products for 2012. 
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Table 2.A Manufacturing Production Workers. Elasticity of the Wage Gap with respect to Mexican 
Real Exchange Rate.* Monthly frequency. Selected periods and sectors 
 
  
Dependent variable: Manufacturing Mexico-United States wage gap 
  
1990:01-1994:12 
 
1995:01-2006:12 
 
2007:01-2013:02 
 Independent 
       variables: 
       Manufacturing 
      
 
Long-term 1.66 
 
1.44 
 
0.93 
 
 
lag t-1 
     
 
Short-term 1.54 
 
0.79 
 
1.07 
 
 
lag t-1 
     
        Primary metals  
      
 
Long-term 1.44 
 
1.25 
 
0.61 
 
 
lag t-1 
 
t-3 
 
t-1 
 
 
Short-term 2.57 
 
1.12 
 
0.90 
 
 
lag t-1 
 
t-3 
 
t-1 
 
        Machinery  
      
 
Long-term 1.91 
 
1.26 
 
0.86 
 
 
lag t-1 
   
t-1 
 
 
Short-term 3.92 
 
1.52 
 
1.56 
 
 
lag t-1 
 
t-1 
 
t-1 
 
        Transportation equipment  
     
 
Long-term 1.79 
 
2.08 
 
1.12 
 
 
lag t-1 
 
t-1 
 
t-1 
 
 
Short-term 3.98 
 
2.09 
 
1.27 
 
 
lag t-1 
 
t-1 
 
t-1 
 
        
 
n 60 
 
143 
 
71 
 
        * Bilateral Mexico-United States, on the basis of consumer price indexes. 
Note 1: All reported estimates are significant at a 99%, as reported on Appendix 2.1. 
Note 2: The 1995:01-2006:12 time period includes a dummy variable for the last month of December 
(intercept), due to a statutory annual bonus payment (aguinaldo). 
Source: Appendix 2.1. 
 
Considering the availability of data, the first period that has been considered in 
Table 2 i.e., from 1987 to 1994 on a monthly basis, has to be restricted in Table 
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2.A due to the data availability in the United States. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
reports hourly wages for these sectors as from 1990.  
 
According to the results, the three tradable sectors expose a coefficient, which is 
not far away from what is obtained for manufacturing as a whole. It would have 
been expected that a larger coefficient would be obtained for these sectors. This is 
the case with transportation equipment,29 exposing a coefficient with a higher value 
than manufacturing as a whole during the three periods considered. That is to say, 
for the long-term, the coefficients obtained have been of 1.79, 2.08 and 1.12 for 
1990:01-1994:12; 1995:01-2006:12 and 2007:01-2013:02, respectively.30  
 
For the short-term, a higher coefficient for transport equipment is also replicated, 
vis-à-vis manufacturing as a whole. For instance, values of 3.98, 2.09 and 1.27 for 
                                               
29 This is taking into account Mexican success in the last phase of labor-intensive car manufacturing 
i.e., assembly. 
30 These coefficients contrast with 1.66, 1.44 and 0.93, respectively period wise, for manufacturing 
output as a whole, also for the long-term.  
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the former, regarding the three respective periods in transportation equipment were 
obtained.31   
 
In opposition to transportation equipment, primary metals expose a coefficient 
systematically below manufacturing as a whole in the long-term. For the short-
term, the results are mixed. In the case of machinery, in the long-term the 
coefficients are comparable with manufacturing as a whole. It is in the short-term 
that they register values well above the entirety of manufacturing production. 
 
Considering the three selected sectors, there is a tendency for a reduction in the 
levels of elasticity observed as time passes. Therefore, appreciation of the Mexican 
currency has been loosing impact in driving an increase in the wage gap. That is to 
say, the fact that Mexico has joined NAFTA reduced the competitive advantage 
derived from the appreciation of the Mexican peso vis-à-vis the dollar, for 
manufacturing as whole as well as in the three selected sectors.  
 
                                               
31 Meanwhile coefficients of 1.54, 0.79 and 1.07 were obtained for manufacturing as a whole for the 
three respective periods.  
  
29 
 
It should be acknowledged that the coefficients observed in the three tradable 
activities are basically along the same lines as manufacturing as a whole. That is to 
say, tradable sectors in Mexico do not expose expected higher coefficients 
regarding the wage gap with respect to the Mexican bilateral real exchange rate. 
  
  
30 
 
Table 2.B Manufacturing Production Workers. Elasticity of the Wage Gap with respect to 
Manufacturing Output Index Ratio.* Monthly frequency. Selected periods and sectors 
 
  
Dependent variable: Manufacturing Mexico-United States wage gap 
  
1990:01-1994:12 
 
1995:01-2006:12 
 
2007:01-2013:02 
 Independent 
       variables: 
       Manufacturing  
      
 
Long-term -1.36 
 
-0.69 
 
-0.66 
 
 
lag t-2 
   
t-3 
 
 
Short-term -1.62 
 
-0.68 
 
-0.78 
 
 
lag t-2 
   
t-3 
 
        Primary metals  
      
 
Long-term 0.60 
 
-0.15 
 
-0.45 
 
 
lag t-1 
 
t-2 
   
 
Short-term 0.44 
 
-0.42 
 
-0.55 
 
 
lag t-1 
 
t-2 
   
        Machinery  
      
 
Long-term -0.37 
 
0.29 
 
-0.17 
 
 
lag t-1 
     
 
Short-term -0.86 
 
-0.21 
 
-0.45 
 
 
lag t-2 
 
t-2 
   
        Transportation equipment  
     
 
Long-term -0.72 
 
-0.40 
 
-0.33 
 
 
lag t-1 
 
t-2 
   
 
Short-term -0.86 
 
-0.41 
 
-0.65 
 
 
lag t-2 
 
t-2 
   
        
 
n 60 
 
143 
 
71 
     
* Mexican manufacturing production index in relation with the U.S. one; each adjusted for inflation with local 
implicit price indexes. 
Note 1: All reported estimates are significant at a 99%, as reported on Appendix 2.1. 
Note 2: The 1995:01-2006:12 time period includes a dummy variable for the last month of December 
(intercept), due to a statutory annual bonus payment (aguinaldo). 
Source: Appendix 2.1. 
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As for the elasticity of the wage gap with respect to manufacturing output, 
manufacturing as a whole, exposed negative coefficients below a unit value for the 
last two periods. This implies that an increase in relative Mexican output vis-à-vis 
the United States, induces a reduction of the wage gap ratio between production 
workers of both countries. Hence, wage differentials would rise.  
 
It is worth to note that the induction of a wage gap increase as a response of a 
relative manufacturing growth in Mexico, exposes, basically, negative values for 
the selected tradable sectors,32 being the rule for manufacturing as a whole. In 
general, there is a tendency for these negative coefficients to reduce their value 
within an inelastic range throughout time. Therefore, the wage gap increase as a 
result of Mexican manufacturing expansion would appear to be losing strength. 
 
What is remarkable is that the elasticity coefficients exposed by the three tradable 
sectors are even below the ones registered by manufacturing as a whole. 33 
                                               
32 The exception is for primary metals in the pre NAFTA period, where positive and inelastic values 
are obtained both in the long (0.60) and short (0.44) terms for 1990:01-1994:12. This is also the 
case for machinery for the long-term (0.29) with respect to 1995:01-2006:12.  
33 In the previous footnote an exception is mentioned. 
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Therefore, their exposure to foreign competition appears not to be a factor for a 
wage gap increase.34  
 
 
 
 
  
                                               
34  From the above, it would be convenient to pursue an analysis comprising the various 
manufacturing sectors in order to better understand these peculiarities. 
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2.2 Ratio of manufacturing output: a relative Mexican surge 
Once it has been established through descriptive statistics a widening wage gap 
(Figure 1), it is relevant to measure whether Mexico or the United States has grown 
to a larger extent. This would be done by measuring the ratio of manufacturing 
output of the first in relation to the second. Hence, in order to evaluate the pace at 
which the manufacturing output ratio has evolved in relative terms, the following 
functional form is proposed: 
 
(2) (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥
𝑖 −𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥
𝑖
 𝑡−12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥
𝑖
 𝑡−12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠
𝑖  −𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 
𝑖
𝑡−12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 
𝑖
𝑡−12
)
𝑡
 =  𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡. 
 
where 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥
𝑖  is the manufacturing production index for Mexico; 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠
𝑖  is the 
manufacturing production index, North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS), for United States; while 𝜀 stands for the error term. The subscript 𝑡 refers 
to the current period of time; 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥
𝑖
 𝑡−12
 is the manufacturing production index for 
Mexico with twelve-month lags. The lags in the dependent variable of equation (2), 
allows obtaining the average annual growth rate for the 𝑖 period, within a monthly 
frequency. Here, a positive sign is assumed, which should made itself present 
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alongside with the aforementioned increasing wage gap observed in descriptive 
statistics, in Chapter 1.  
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Table 3 Manufacturing Output. Growth Rates. Monthly frequency. Selected Periods 
       
      Dependent variable: 
      Ratio of Manufacturing output* 
    Independent 
variable: 
  
      
  1987:01-1994:12 n=96 constant  1.33 
       
  1995:01-2006:12 n=144 constant  n.s. 
       
  2007:01-2013:02 n=71 constant  1.26 
       
* Ratio of Mexican manufacturing production index in relation with the one for United States, both in local 
currencies. 
Note 1: All reported estimates are significant at a 99%, as reported on Appendix 2.1.2. 
Note 2: n.s. stands for no significance. 
Source: Appendix 2.1.2. 
 
Mexican manufacturing output growth has been larger than the corresponding one 
for United States. This happens with respect to 1987-1994 and 2007 up to date 
time periods, with a year-over-year percent change of 1.33 and 1.26 respectively, 
within a monthly frequency. Then, the average annual growth rate for the first 
period is 1.33% for each year. Although, this is a short-term coefficient, it exposes 
a larger dynamism of the Mexican output with respect to United States output.35 As 
from 2007-up to date, the ratio exposes a similar coefficient (1.26).36 So far, this 
                                               
35 Were Mexico to maintain this surge in the medium term, it would indeed reduce the sizable 
manufacturing gap that at present has with United States.  
36 The 1995 to 2006 period yields results with no significance. 
  
36 
vigorous pace exhibited by Mexico manufacturing output has been translated into a 
deleterious effect in the wage gap. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Wage elasticity: Mexico with respect to United States   
It is relevant to find out whether the wages of manufacturing production workers in 
United States have any influence in the earnings of their Mexican counterparts. In 
this purpose, wages of Mexican manufacturing production workers in Mexico are 
made dependent on United States wages, and the real exchange rate of the 
Mexican peso per dollar. Therefore, the impact of United States wages of 
production workers in the corresponding Mexican workers, is being evaluated, on 
the one hand. On the other, the effect of appreciation or depreciation of the 
Mexican currency in the wages prevailing in Mexico, is estimated.  
 
(3)  𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥
𝑖
ℎ𝑚𝑥
𝑖
𝐸𝑜
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠
𝑖
)
 
𝑡
 =  𝑐𝑡 +  𝛼 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑤𝑢𝑠
𝑖
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠
𝑖 )
𝑡−𝑗
 +  𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐)𝑡−𝑗  +
 𝜀𝑡.  
 
where 𝑊𝑚𝑥
𝑖  is the wage bill or payroll for Mexican manufacturing production 
workers; ℎ𝑚𝑥
𝑖  is the number of hours of manufacturing production workers for the 
Mexican manufacturing industry; 𝐸𝑜 is the nominal exchange rate, i.e. pesos per 
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dollar; 𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠
𝑖  is United States producer price index for finished goods; 𝑤𝑢𝑠
𝑖  is 
average hourly earnings of manufacturing production and nonsupervisory workers; 
𝐸𝑟𝑐  is the Mexican bilateral real exchange computed with consumer prices;
37 𝜀 
stands for the error term. The superscript 𝑖 represents three different periods, i.e. 
𝑖 = 1 covers from January of 1987 to December of 1994; 𝑖 = 2 stands for January 
of 1995 to December, 2006; 𝑖 = 3 considers from January, 2007 to February, 2013. 
The subscript 𝑡 refers to the current period of time considered; 𝑗 refers to time lags, 
where 𝑗 = 1, 2,… , 𝑛.  
 
In estimating the influence of United States wages in Mexican ones, both are 
adjusted for inflation by means of the producer price index for finished goods of the 
United States. The use of this deflator is assuming that output decisions regarding 
manufacturing in both countries are taken in terms of dollars and not of Mexican 
pesos. Whether the output decision makers are United States firms having plants 
in the United States and in Mexico, or subcontracting in Mexico, their estimates 
and adjustment for inflation ought to be done in United States currency.38   
                                               
37 Defined in Appendix 1. 
38 It is not expected that output decisions, particularly dominated by tradables, are to be conducted 
in terms of Mexican currency. 
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Regarding the expected signs for equation (3), a positive coefficient of Mexican 
wages with respect to the ones in the United States is expected. A surge in United 
States wages would have a positive impact in Mexican wages.39 
 
As far as the elasticity of Mexican wages is concerned with respect to the Mexican 
bilateral real exchange rate, it would reflect the appreciation or depreciation effects 
over Mexican wages. It is expected that an appreciation of the Mexican currency 
would raise prices, at least in a proportional fashion. Therefore, a positive and 
elastic coefficient is expected. 
 
The above expression (3) is being estimated as a cointegrating equation in order to 
obtain long-term coefficients. Afterwards, an error correction method is being 
applied, in order to determine short-term coefficients.  
 
                                               
39 It should be borne in mind that considering the wage gap, a stimulus to American wages, even 
with a proportional increase in Mexico, would imply a far lower increase, due to the prevailing wage 
gap. 
  
40 
Before Mexico joined NAFTA extremely high coefficients are being observed, as 
shown in Table 4. The elasticity of Mexican hourly wages, with respect to United 
States is i.e. 2.44 in the long-term, along with 7.32 in the short-term. 
 
Table 4. Manufacturing Production Workers. Elasticity of Mexican hourly wage with respect to 
United States hourly wages and Mexican real exchange rate. Monthly frequency. Selected Periods 
      
  Dependent variable: Mexican hourly wage*  
  1987:01-1994:12 1995:01-2006:12 2007:01-2013:02  
Independent     
variables:     
United States hourly wage*    
 Long-term 2.44 0.88 1.34  
 lag     
 Short-term 7.32 3.63 2.63  
 lag     
      
Mexican real exchange rate**    
 Long-term 1.38 1.42 1.29  
 lag t-1    
 Short-term 3.82 1.66 1.54  
 lag t-1    
      
 n 96 144 72  
      
* United States dollars of 1982 per hour, using producer price index (finished goods), nsa. 
** Bilateral on the basis of consumer price indexes. 
Note: All reported estimates are significant at a 99%, as reported on Appendix 2.2. 
Source: Appendix 2.2. 
 
In reference to the first post NAFTA period, i.e. from 1995 to 2006 the long-term 
coefficient becomes positive and elastic (0.88), exposing a reduced fluctuation of 
Mexican wages in response to United States wage changes. In the current period 
(2007-up to date), the long-term coefficient becomes ostensibly elastic (1.34). In 
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the short-term, the corresponding coefficients fluctuate between 2.63 (2007-up to 
date) and 3.63 (1995-2006). In a study by Revenga and Montenegro (1998), 
similar results for workers employed in the same industry are found. These authors 
obtained point estimates quite large, and a positive association between Mexican 
and United States relative wages for the period 1984-1990.  
 
Another independent variable of equation (3), reported in Table 4, is the Mexican 
bilateral real exchange rate. This variable systematically exposes coefficients 
above the unit value. Its coefficients values are elastic and positive, both in the 
long and short-term. In the long-term, the elasticity of Mexican hourly wage is 
systematically above the unit value fluctuating between 1.42 and 1.29, both in the 
pre NAFTA period and the post NAFTA ones. In the short-term, these coefficients 
tend to be systematically higher, suggesting an elastic fluctuation of Mexican 
wages as a result of the appreciation of the Mexican currency. In the short-term, 
the elasticity reaches a maximum value of 3.82 for the pre NAFTA period.  
 
Hence, the appreciation of the Mexican peso increases the value of wages 
expressed in United States currency, and vice-versa in an elastic fashion. 
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Robertson (2005b), who stands out for analyzing the wage gap along with the 
exchange rate, finds that this last variable plays a major role on its determination. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Derived demand for United States labor: United States and Mexican wages 
As an alternative way to evaluate Mexican manufacturing wages and its effect in 
United States manufacturing labor market, the concept of derived demand is 
used.40 That is to say, the demand for manufacturing labor is precisely derived 
from the demand for manufacturing products.41 In this case, United States derived 
demand for labor, i.e. employment, would depend on the United States wages that 
are being paid in the labor market. Also, United States derived demand for labor 
could be related to the Mexican wages as a substitute or complement. The same 
type of dependency would happen with the wage bill or payrolls of the United 
States as regressand, while both United States and Mexican wages became the 
regressors. 
 
4.1 On production manufacturing workers 
In order to evaluate the effect of the Mexican manufacturing average hourly wages, 
over the derived manufacturing labor demand of United States, the following 
                                               
40 McConnell, Brue and Macpherson (2008). 
41 “The price of the goods a worker buys is the cost of his labor to the employer.” Ohlin (1967), p. 
146. 
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expression is put forward. Here, it is measured how do entrepreneurs react 
demanding labor as a result of United States wages on the one hand and Mexican 
wages on the other. Besides, the effect in labor demand as a result of relative 
manufacturing output in Mexico and the United States is also taken into account.  
 
(4) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐿𝑢𝑠
𝑖 )
𝑡
 =  𝑐𝑡  + 𝛼 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥
𝑖
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠
𝑖  
)
𝑡−𝑗
+  𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑤𝑢𝑠
𝑖
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠
𝑖 )
𝑡−𝑗
 +
 𝛾 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥
𝑖
ℎ𝑚𝑥
𝑖
𝐸𝑜
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠
𝑖
)
 
𝑡−𝑗
 + 𝜀𝑡.  
 
where 𝐿𝑢𝑠
𝑖  are the production and nonsupervisory employees in United States;  
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥
𝑖  is the manufacturing production index for Mexico in local currency; 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠
𝑖  
is the manufacturing production index, North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS) for United States expressed in local currency, 𝑤𝑢𝑠
𝑖  is the average 
hourly earnings of manufacturing production and nonsupervisory workers; 𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠
𝑖  is 
the United States producer price index, finished goods; 𝑊𝑚𝑥
𝑖  is the wage bill or 
payroll for Mexican manufacturing production workers; ℎ𝑚𝑥
𝑖  is the number of hours 
for the Mexican manufacturing; 𝐸𝑜 is the nominal exchange rate i.e., pesos per 
dollar; 𝜀 stands for the error term. The subscript 𝑡 refers to the current period of 
time considered; 𝑗 refers to the lag periods of time where 𝑗 = 1, 2,… , 𝑛.  
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A negative coefficient is expected for manufacturing output ratio between Mexico 
and the United States. This would imply that an increase in Mexican manufacturing 
output vis-à-vis the United States, would convey a reduction in the demand for 
labor in the last mentioned country. This negative sign is assuming that a degree of 
displacement of United States workers takes place when relative manufacturing 
output growth in Mexico occurs. Regarding the demand of labor with respect to 
United States workers, a negative sign is expected, following the rationale by 
entrepreneurs i.e., the lower the wage, the higher the quantity of labor demanded 
and vice versa. An increase in Mexican hourly wages it is expected to cause an 
increase in the demand for labor in the United States. Therefore, a positive sign is 
expected.  
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Table 5. Manufacturing Production Workers. Elasticity of United States Production and 
Nonsupervisory Employees, with respect to United States and Mexican hourly wages. Monthly 
frequency. Selected Periods 
      
  Dependent variable: United States production and  
                                  nonsupervisory employees  
  1987:01-1994:12 1995:01-2006:12 2007:01-2013:02  
Independent     
variables:     
Manufacturing output index ratio**    
 Long-term n.s. n.s. -0.88  
 lag     
 Short-term n.s. n.s. -0.05  
 lag     
      
United States hourly wage*    
 Long-term n.s. n.s. -0.59  
 lag   t-1  
 Short-term n.s. n.s. -0.14  
 lag   t-1  
      
Mexican hourly wage*    
 Long-term n.s. n.s. 0.37  
 lag     
 Short-term n.s. n.s. 0.04  
 lag     
      
Dummy***   
 Long-term n.s. n.s. 0.03  
 lag     
 Short-term n.s. n.s. -0.04  
 lag     
 n 94 142 70  
      
* United States dollars of 1982 per hour, using producer price index (finished goods), nsa. 
** Ratio of Mexican to United States manufacturing production indexes. 
*** An annual bonus paid in December (aguinaldo) required the introduction of a Dummy variable. 
Note 1: n.s. stands for no significance. 
Note 2: All reported estimates are significant at a 99%, as reported on Appendix 2.3. 
Source: Appendix 2.3. 
 
Statistical results are found to be significant only for the current period i.e., 2007-up 
to date (Table 5). In the long-term, the elasticity of labor demand for manufacturing 
production workers in the United States is negative (-0.88) with respect to the ratio 
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of Mexican-United States manufacturing indexes. In consequence, when the index 
of United States manufacturing rises more than the one in Mexico, labor demand in 
the United States grows, in a close to an elastic fashion. However, the fact that 
manufacturing output in Mexico expands at a higher rate than in United States,42 
labor demand in this last country falls. This result holds for the current period i.e., 
from 2007-up to date, as Mexican manufacturing relative growth vis-à-vis United 
States weakens labor demand in the latter. In the short-term, the effect is close to 
zero. This coefficient suggests that output decisions are operated in the long-term 
only.  
 
The long-term elasticity of demand for labor in the United States with respect to the 
hourly wage is negative and inelastic (-0.59).43 This result, for the period from 
2007-up to date, is along the lines of labor demand for production manufacturing 
workers, as reported by Slaughter (1997). In the short-term, the coefficient 
becomes neatly inelastic (-0.14), losing influence.  
 
                                               
42 See equation 2, above, holding for the pre NAFTA period and for the current one, i.e. 2007 to 
date. 
43 Lagged one period. 
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Mexican wages expose a degree of substitution vis-à-vis United States labor 
demand for the current period (0.37) in the long-term.44 Therefore, this coefficient 
exposes a degree of substitution of Mexican manufacturing production workers 
with respect to United States demand for manufacturing production workers, 
although within an inelastic range.45  
 
From the previous results no trace of complementary effect is found in Table 5. 
However, Robertson (2006) is of a different opinion.46 By using a labor demand 
approach, he claims that Mexican and United States manufacturing production 
workers behave like complements during the NAFTA period.47  
 
Later on Robertson et al. (2008) formally test the above mentioned 
complementariness hypothesis. Econometric results are provided for supporting 
                                               
44 This result holds from January to November. The December slope, dummy, has an almost zero 
value for the long and short-term. 
45 These results are in line with the econometric estimates of Armington elasticities. As a further 
reference, see Reinert and Roland-Holst (1992), and/or Donelly, Johnson and Tsigas (2004). 
46 Acemoglu, Gancia and Ziliboti (2012) generalize the complementariness of wages in developed 
countries vis-à-vis emerging economies, encompassing these last ones as offshore production. 
47 “The finding that U.S. and Mexican production workers are complements brings good and bad 
news (in the normative sense).” However, this paper does not provide empirical evidence, either in 
terms of econometric tests or descriptive statistics to support this assertion. 
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the complementariness between production workers in United States and 
Mexico.48 Their estimates suggest that if United States wages rise, the demand for 
Mexican workers is reduced. That is to say, assuming a constant output, Mexican 
and United States workers are p-complements. However, even within the United 
States Borjas, Grogger & Hanson (2008) did not find evidence to support labor 
market complementariness between immigrants and United States native 
employment. 
 
The question as to whether Mexican wages are complements or substitutes with 
respect to demand for American labor,49 has received a degree of relevance in the 
literature. In the case of Gandolfi et al. (2014) a price substitution nature of 
Mexican and United States workers is being assumed.50 However, in Robertson 
(2006) and Robertson et al. (2008) it is claimed and proved respectively, that 
                                               
48 “The main results suggest that, during the NAFTA period, Mexican U.S. production workers (and 
Mexican and Canadian production workers) are complements, rather than substitutes, suggesting 
that both countries could benefit from viewing the economies as partners rather than competitors.” 
49 Or vice-versa: United States wages with respect to demand for Mexican labor. 
50 “We assume that Mexican and US workers are price substitutes, such that an increase in the 
wages of American workers increases the demand for Mexican labor.” 
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binational wages are complements. Peculiarly enough, Robertson is a third 
coauthor in Gandolfi et al. (2014).  
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4.2. On wage bill or payrolls 
Regarding labor compensation as derived demand, the wage bill or payroll was 
estimated as a function of United States and Mexican hourly wages. Therefore, 
regarding the United States, the effect of wages and manufacturing output in the 
wage bill is to be estimated. Besides, the effect of Mexican wages in the United 
States wage bill, is also to be estimated. Thus, 
 
(5)  𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑊𝑢𝑠
𝑖
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠
𝑖 )
𝑡
 =  𝑐𝑡  +  𝛼 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑤𝑢𝑠
𝑖
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠
𝑖 )
𝑡−𝑗
 + 𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠
𝑖 )
𝑡−𝑗
+
 𝛾 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥
𝑖
ℎ𝑚𝑥
𝑖
𝐸𝑜
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠
𝑖
)
 
𝑡−𝑗
   +  𝜀𝑡. 
 
where 𝑊𝑢𝑠
𝑖  is the manufacturing wage bill or wage payroll for production 
manufacturing in the United States; 𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠
𝑖  is the United States producer price index 
for finished goods; 𝑤𝑢𝑠
𝑖  is the average hourly earnings of manufacturing production 
and nonsupervisory workers; 𝑊𝑚𝑥
𝑖  is the wage bill or payroll for Mexican 
manufacturing production workers; ℎ𝑚𝑥
𝑖  is the number of hours of manufacturing 
production workers for the Mexican manufacturing industry; 𝐸𝑜  is the nominal 
exchange rate, i.e. pesos per dollar; 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠
𝑖  is the manufacturing production index, 
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North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) for United States 
expressed in local currency; while 𝜀 stands for the error term. The superscript 𝑖 
refers to 𝑖 = 1, 2  and 3  expressing the time period under consideration. The 
subscript 𝑡 refers to the current period of time considered; 𝑗 refers to lag periods of 
time where 𝑗 = 1, 2,… , 𝑛.  
 
An increase in United States hourly wages is to bear a positive sign, as they 
enhance the American wage bill. A rise in manufacturing output in the United 
States would lead to an increase in the wage bill, also of the United States. 
Besides, the Mexican hourly wages should bear a positive sign, as its increase 
should convey an expansion of the wage bill in the United States, due to a degree 
of substitution between them.    
 
In the long-term, the elasticity of United States wage bill with respect to their hourly 
wages has been on the rise, growing consistently from 0.58 in the pre NAFTA 
period (1987-1994) to 1.90 during the current period (2007 up to date).51 In the 
                                               
51 These results are consistent with Rodrik (1997). He found that the more open an economy is, the 
greater the volatility in earnings resulting from shocks to labor demand (p. 12-13). 
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short-term, a similar trend is found, although at a lower pace, with coefficients 
below the unit value for the period 1987-1994 and basically equal to one for the 
last period. That is to say, in the short-term, coefficients range from 0.62 in the pre 
NAFTA period (1987-1995) to 0.97 during the current post NAFTA period, i.e. 2007 
up to date. 
  
  
54 
Table 6. Manufacturing Production Workers. Elasticity of United States Wage Bill with respect to 
hourly wages and Manufacturing Production Index of United States and Mexican hourly wages. 
Monthly frequency. Selected Periods. 
     
  Dependent variable: United States wage bill* 
  1987:01-1994:12 1995:01-2006:12 2007:01 2013:02 
Independent    
variables:    
United States hourly wages*   
 Long term 0.58 n.s. 1.90 
 lag    
 Short term 0.62 n.s. 0.97 
 lag    
     
United States manufacturing production index  
 Long term 0.24 n.s. 1.16 
 lag t-1   
 Short term 0.18 n.s. 0.47 
 lag t-1   
     
Mexican hourly wages*   
 Long term -0.07 n.s. 0.14 
 lag    
 Short term 0.03 n.s. 0.05 
 lag    
     
 n 63  72 
     
* United States dollars of 1982 per hour, using producer price index (finished goods), nsa. 
Note 1: n.s. stands for no significance. 
Note 2: All reported estimates are significant at a 99%, as reported on Appendix 2.4. 
Source: Appendix 2.4. 
 
The manufacturing production index for United States exposes increasing values 
over time during the short-term. Its coefficients rose from 0.1852 during the pre 
NAFTA period, to 0.47 during the current one (2007 to date). In the long-term, the 
manufacturing production index is ostensibly inelastic (0.24)53 in the pre NAFTA 
                                               
52 Lagged one period. 
53 Lagged one period. 
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period (1987-1994). However, during the current period, i.e. 2007-up to date, this 
index shows an elastic coefficient (1.16). Therefore, these last results expose a 
neat elastic influence of the manufacturing production index over the wage bill, in 
the long-term.  
 
Regarding Mexican hourly wages effect they are close to zero, except for the long-
term. This is reported with a coefficient value of 0.14 for the last period. Although 
this coefficient is positive, it is also close to zero.  
 
While Mexican wages affect the demand of labor in United States, 54  their 
remuneration is so scant, that they do not have any incidence. This happens when 
manufacturing production workers in United States take the form of labor 
compensation. 
  
                                               
54 Although with an inelastic coefficient (0.37) in the long term. See equation 4, above. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusions 
The wage gap between Mexican and United States manufacturing production 
workers remained at the same level, i.e. 0.15 in the 1987-1995 pre NAFTA period 
and 0.14 in the first post NAFTA period (1995-2006), when measured in dollars 
adjusted for inflation. As from 2007 to date, i.e. the second post NAFTA period 
under consideration, far from experiencing a reduction, this gap has widened to 
over one tenth (0.11). At the same time, there is a downward trend in the variance 
of this gap, witnessed by a declining coefficient of variation (CV), due to more 
stability in Mexican wages alongside a contraction of Mexican wages. In brief, a 
widening gap is being registered as long as wage dispersion is reduced.  
 
These facts would appear to take place independently of whether Mexico has been 
-or not- a member of NAFTA. That is to say, NAFTA does not seem to make a 
difference in the behaviour of the wage gap throughout the time periods 
considered. As a result, the possibility of confirming the Stolper-Samuelson and the 
Factor Price Equalization theorems appear to be somehow distant. Nevertheless, 
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there are some peculiarities between manufacturing production workers in United 
States and Mexican labor, which are being examined. 
 
The Mexican bilateral real exchange rate plays a key role, alongside with the 
manufacturing output in determining the wage rate. The former displays positive 
and elastic coefficients over the wage gap, basically above a unit value throughout 
the three periods under consideration. Therefore, reductions in the wage gap are 
subject to the vagaries of the exchange rate when appreciation of the Mexican 
peso could be sustained. The above conclusions hold for manufacturing as a 
whole as well as considering three key tradable sectors i.e., primary metals, 
machinery and transport equipment. However, on the whole, there is a tendency 
for these coefficients to reduce their extent throughout the three periods 
considered, while they remain exposing elastic values. 
 
The elasticity of the wage gap between Mexico and United States exposes a 
negative coefficient with respect to the ratio of Mexico and United States 
manufacturing output, with coefficients ranging from -0.66 to -0.93 in the long-term, 
for 2007 to date and 1987-1994 periods, respectively. In the short-term, the 
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coefficient goes from -0.68 to -1.56 for the periods of 1995-2006 and 1987-1994. In 
this sense, the negative coefficient of the wage gap with respect to manufacturing 
output constitutes a persistent pattern. When three tradable sectors were added, 
an increase in the wage gap as a response to a relative output growth in Mexican 
manufacturing appear to be losing strength throughout time, exposing on the 
whole, inelastic coefficients. 
 
There has been a substantial dynamism in Mexico vis-à-vis the United States 
regarding manufacturing output. Paradoxically, the relative betterment of the 
Mexican economy in terms basically of manufacturing output in relation to United 
States, has affected the wage gap in a negative fashion. The negative effect is 
confirmed when the ratio of manufacturing output of Mexico with the United States, 
exposes a positive growth trend for the pre NAFTA and the current period.  
 
In the pre NAFTA period, i.e. 1987-1994, the elasticity coefficients of Mexican 
wages with respect to the ones in United States expose extremely high 
coefficients, both in the long and short-terms, as reported in Table 4. This is in 
contrast with the first post NAFTA period and the current one, where while 
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remaining elastic in the long and short-terms, they expose a reduction in their 
values. 
 
The appreciation of the Mexican currency has a positive effect in Mexican wages 
expressed in dollars, with coefficients systematically positive and above the unit 
value, both for the long and short-terms. The real exchange rate variable is 
relevant, as NAFTA has not envisaged a monetary union or even a pegging of 
currencies to the dollar, for instance.  
 
Regarding the empirical results reported in Table 5, the elasticity of labor demand 
in the United States for the current period, i.e. 2007-up to date, with respect to the 
ratio of Mexico-United States manufacturing output exposed a negative coefficient 
(-0.88). Considering that this ratio has a positive growth, Mexican relative 
manufacturing surge brings about a reduction, although in an inelastic fashion, on 
the demand of United States manufacturing production workers.  
 
The own price labor demand elasticity was within the values (-0.59) found in the 
literature. The Mexican price labor demand elasticity exposes a degree of 
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substitution, with a positive coefficient (0.37) although inelastic, for the year 
around, excluding the month of December where the introduction of a dummy was 
required. This value suggests that Mexican wages are behaving as a substitute 
vis–à-vis United States labor demand. All the above results refer to the long-term, 
as in the short-term, i.e. the coefficients turn out to be close to zero, except in the 
case of the own price labor demand elasticity. Besides, only the current period, i.e. 
from 2007-up to date, proved to be statistically significant. These values suggest 
that the demand of labor involves a planned decision involving the long-term.  
 
Once the demand for labor is expressed as a wage bill and its elasticity is 
estimated with respect to the United States hourly wage, it proved to be significant 
for the pre NAFTA and the current period only. This elasticity has been on the rise, 
growing from an inelastic value both in the short and long-terms in the pre NAFTA 
period, reaching ostensibly elastic values in the current period. While the elasticity 
of the wage bill with respect to United States manufacturing index was inelastic in 
the pre NAFTA period, as from 2007, it exposes a coefficient slightly beyond the 
unit value in the long-term. The Mexican hourly wage exposes a coefficient 
systematically inelastic and frequently close to zero in the first and last periods.  
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The degree of substitution of Mexican wages was confirmed when manufacturing 
production workers in United States were considered in terms of labor. Once labor 
in United States is expressed in monetary units the coefficients become zero, due 
to the wage gap. No degree of complementariness has yet been found. 
 
The FPE and SS are the theoretical references for wage convergence. However 
there are some elements like labor migration and labor mobility among industries, 
that are not part of those theorems. The application of these elements conveys 
some constraints.  
 
When the migration element is taken into account, it would introduce modifications 
in the FPE and SS theorems for the Mexico and United States case. In this case, 
labor mobility in a unilateral manner (from Mexico to the United States), could 
thereby alter the expected outcome. 
 
Controlling for migration in the present econometric models, i.e. inclusion of a 
migration variable would be more suitable for a research, which is not heavily 
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based in longitudinal series. The present work uses variables with monthly 
frequency. The inclusion of the migration variable would substantially reduce the 
degrees of freedom, since it implies reducing the monthly frequency to an annual 
frequency. This is because border enforcement data is available on a yearly basis 
for the time period of 1997-2012.55 
 
Besides, the inclusion of the migration variable would also diminish the consistency 
of the estimators given the reduction of the sample size. It is important to underline 
that the manufacturing production index is used as a proxy variable for value 
added, since the former is available with monthly frequency and the latter is 
available with quarterly frequency. The use of the manufacturing production index 
is ideal since the surveys for this sector in United States and Mexico bear monthly 
frequency. Therefore, the manufacturing production index allows exploring these 
survey databases, conveying a larger amount of degrees of freedom. 
 
 
                                               
55 Homeland Security 2012 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, retrieved from: 
http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2012-enforcement-actions 
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APPENDIX 1. Relation of variables and sources 
Data Description Source Country 
ID    
𝐸0 SF328 Tipo de cambio pesos por dolar para solventar obligaciones denominadas en 
moneda extranjera (Nominal exchange rate, pesos per dollar) 
 
D Mx. 
𝐸𝑟𝑐 Mexican bilateral real exchange rate pesos per dollar, consumer prices 𝑝
∗/𝐸0/𝑝  
    
ℎ𝑚𝑥 Horas trabajadas, monthly man hours, manufacturing production, thousands 
 
F Mx. 
𝐿𝑢𝑠 CEU3000000006 Production and nonsupervisory employees, nsa., thousands of persons A U.S. 
    
𝑝 CUUR0000SA0 Consumer price index-all urban consumers, nsa., United States city 
average, all items, 1982-84=100 
 
B U.S. 
𝑝∗ Indice nacional de precios al consumidor, base diciembre 2010=100, (National consumer 
price index) 
 
E Mx. 
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 WPUSOP3000 Producer price index, finished goods, nsa., 1982=100 B U.S. 
    
𝑝𝑝∗ 328679 National index of producer prices, June 2012=100 B U.S. 
    
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 Manufacturing production index, 2003=100 
 
F Mx 
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 IP.B00004.N G17/IP Major industry groups, manufacturing, index 2007=100, not seasonally 
adjusted, NAICS (North American Industry Classification System) 
 
F Mx 
𝑊𝑚𝑥  Remuneración de asalariados (labor compensation), manufacturing production  
workers aggregate monthly payroll, thousands of pesos 
 
C U.S. 
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 APPENDIX 1. Relation of variables and sources (continues) 
 
  
Short 
name 
Description/Identifier Source Country 
𝑊𝑢𝑠 CEU3000000082 Aggregate weekly payrolls of production and nonsupervisory employees,  
nsa., thousands of dollars 
F Mx. 
    
𝑤𝑢𝑠 CEU3000000008 Average hourly earnings of production and nonsupervisory employees, 
nsa., dollars 
A U.S. 
    
    
Sources 
A BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics), CES (Current Employment Statistics), National; 
B BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics). Producer Price Index-Commodities; Consumer Price Index-all Urban Consumers; 
C Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Industrial production and capacity utilization; 
D Banco de Mexico (Banxico), Mexican Central Bank, mercados financieros (financial markets); 
E Banco de Mexico (Banxico), Mexican Central Bank, precios e inflacion (prices and inflation); 
F Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia (INEGI), National Institute of Statistics and Geography, Encuesta Industrial Mensual (Monthly 
Industrial Survey). Four overlapped periods: 1987:01-1995:12, Mexican Catalog of Economic Activities (CMAE Catalogo Mexicano de Actividades 
Economicas) for 129 types of economic activities; 1994:01-2008:12, Mexican Classification of Activities and Products (CMAP 1994 Clasificacion 
Mexicana de Actividades y Productos) for 205 types of economic activities; 2005:01-2010:12, North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS 2002) for 230 types of economic activities; 2007:01-2012:10, North American Industry Classification System (NAICS 2007) for 240 types of 
economic activities. 
G BEA (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis), NIPA tables. 
Note: U.S. stands for United States; Mx. stands for Mexico; nsa stands for not seasonally adjusted; SIC stands for Standard Industrial 
Classification; NAICS stands for North American Industrial Classification System. 
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APPENDIX 2. Statistic Results 
 
Appendix 2.1  
Statistics of Table 2A. Elasticity of the Mexico-United States Wage Gap with Respect to Bilateral Real Exchange Rate. 
Monthly frequency. Selected Periods 
 
Manufacturing (whole) 
 
Long-term 
𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 1987:01−1994:12
ℎ𝑚𝑥 1987:01−1994:12
𝐸𝑜 1987:01−1994:12
𝑤𝑢𝑠 1987:01−1994:12
)
 
 
 
 
 =  3.90 +  1.56(𝐸𝑟𝑐 1987:01−1994:12)𝑡−1 − 0.93 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 1987:01−1994:12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 1987:01−1994:12 
)
𝑡−2
 . 
      (10.11)∗∗∗ (17.59)∗∗∗  (−4.12)∗∗ 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.81       𝐷.𝑊.= 1.70      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −1.31     𝑛 = 1987: 01 − 1994:12 
 
Note: Values in parenthesis stand for the t-Statistics, whereby (   )*** 99% of statistical significance; (   )** 95% of statistical significance; (   )* 90% 
of statistic significance. 
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Short-term 
 
∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 1987:02−1994:12
ℎ𝑚𝑥 1987:02−1994:12
𝐸𝑜 1987:02−1994:12
𝑤𝑢𝑠 1987:02−1994:12
)
 
 
 
 
 =  0.0004 + 1.67 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 1987:02−1994:12)𝑡−1 − 1.56 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 1987:02−1994:12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 1987:02−1994:12 
)
𝑡−2
− 
         (0.03)   (1.85)∗∗   (−7.02)∗∗∗     
0.86(𝜀1)𝑡−1. 
(−8.19)∗∗∗  
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.55      𝐷.𝑊.= 2.05      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −1.38   𝑛 = 1987:02 − 1994: 12 
 
Long-term 
𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 1990:01−1994:12
ℎ𝑚𝑥 1990:01−1994:12
𝐸𝑜 1990:01−1994:12
𝑤𝑢𝑠 1990:01−1994:12
)
 
 
 
 
 =  4.48 +  1.66(𝐸𝑟𝑐 1990:01−1994:12)𝑡−1 − 1.36 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 1990:01−1994:12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 1990:01−1994:12 
)
𝑡−2
 . 
      (7.93)∗∗∗ (10.38)∗∗∗  (−4.57)∗∗ 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.68       𝐷.𝑊.= 2.19      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −1.43     𝑛 = 1990: 01 − 1994:12 
Note: Values in parenthesis stand for the t-Statistics, whereby (   )*** 99% of statistical significance; (   )** 95% of statistical significance; (   )* 90% 
of statistic significance. 
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Short-term 
 
∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 1990:02−1994:12
ℎ𝑚𝑥 1990:02−1994:12
𝐸𝑜 1990:02−1994:12
𝑤𝑢𝑠 1990:02−1994:12
)
 
 
 =  0.0002 + 1.54 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 1990:02−1994:12)𝑡−1 −
1.62 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 1990:02−1994:12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 1990:02−1994:12 
)
𝑡−2
− 1.15(𝜀2)𝑡−1. 
(0.03)  (1.08)∗∗     (−5.86)∗∗∗      (−7.96)∗∗∗ 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.62      𝐷.𝑊.= 2.01      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −1.40   𝑛 = 1990:02 − 1994: 12 
Long-term 
𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 1995:01−2006:12
ℎ𝑚𝑥 1995:01−2006:12
𝐸𝑜 1995:01−2006:12
𝑤𝑢𝑠 1995:01−2006:12
)
 
 
 
 
 =  2.95 +  1.44  𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 1995:01−2006:12) − 0.69 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 1995:01−2006:12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 1995:01−2006:12  
) + 0.40 𝐷 . 
     (15.02)∗∗∗ (26.31)∗∗∗  (−3.81)∗∗∗                              (17.29)∗∗∗ 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.88       𝐷.𝑊.= 0.33      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −2.29     𝑛 = 1995: 01 − 2006:12 
 
Note: D stands for a December dummy variable. 
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Short-term 
 
∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 1995:02−2006:12
ℎ𝑚𝑥 1995:02−2006:12
𝐸𝑜 1995:02−2006:12
𝑤𝑢𝑠 1995:02−2006:12
)
 
 
 =  −0.03 + 0.79 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 1995:02−2006:12 ) −
0.68 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 1995:02−2006:12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 1995:02−2006:12 
) + 0.43 𝐷 − 0.68(𝜀3)𝑡−1. 
(−3.00)  (2.07)∗∗∗      (−2.95)∗∗∗     (11.01)∗∗∗  (−1.17)  
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.55      𝐷.𝑊.= 2.09      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −1.29    𝑛 = 1995: 02 − 2006:12 
 
Note: When the error term is no significant, it means that it is no significantly different from zero. Thus, the long-term relationship established in the 
cointegration equation is in equilibrium, Kennedy (1992). 
 
Long-term 
𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
ℎ𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
𝐸𝑜 2007:01−2013:02
𝑤𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
)
 
 
 
 
 =  1.02 +  0.93  𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 2007:01−2013:02 ) − 0.66 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02 
)
𝑡−3
 . 
     (1.95)∗∗∗  (5.78)∗∗∗  (−3.56)∗∗∗ 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.48       𝐷.𝑊.= 1.98      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −2.07     𝑛 = 2007: 01 − 2013:02 
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Short-term 
 
∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
ℎ𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
𝐸𝑜 2007:01−2013:02
𝑤𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
)
 
 
 
 
 =  0.0005+ 1.07 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 2007:01−2013:02 ) − 0.77 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02 
)
𝑡−3
 
          (0.05)  (3.15)∗∗∗       (−3.21)∗∗∗   
 
     −1.06(𝜀3)𝑡−1. 
 (−7.84)∗∗∗ 
 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.60      𝐷.𝑊.= 1.87      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −2.04    𝑛 = 2007: 01 − 2013:02 
 
 
  
  
70 
Primary metals (331) 
 
Long-term 
𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 1990:01−1994:12
ℎ𝑚𝑥 1990:01−1994:12
𝐸𝑜 1990:01−1994:12
𝑤𝑢𝑠 1990:01−1994:12
)
 
 
 
 
 =  2.87 +  1.44(𝐸𝑟𝑐 1990:01−1994:12)𝑡−1 + 0.60 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 1990:01−1994:12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 1990:01−1994:12 
)
𝑡−1
 . 
      (5.54)∗∗∗ (9.19)∗∗∗  (2.83)∗∗ 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.61       𝐷.𝑊.= 1.99      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −1.48     𝑛 = 1990: 01 − 1994:12 
Note: Values in parenthesis stand for the t-Statistics, whereby (   )*** 99% of statistical significance; (   )** 95% of statistical significance; (   )* 90% 
of statistic significance. 
 
Short-term 
∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 1990:02−1994:12
ℎ𝑚𝑥 1990:02−1994:12
𝐸𝑜 1990:02−1994:12
𝑤𝑢𝑠 1990:02−1994:12
)
 
 
 =  −0.003 + 2.57 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 1990:02−1994:12)𝑡−1 +
0.44 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 1990:02−1994:12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 1990:02−1994:12 
)
𝑡−1
− 1.00(𝜀5)𝑡−1. 
(−0.25)  (1.86)∗∗     (2.34)∗∗∗     (−7.51)∗∗∗ 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.54      𝐷.𝑊.= 1.94      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −1.50   𝑛 = 1990:02 − 1994: 12 
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Long-term 
𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 1995:01−2006:12
ℎ𝑚𝑥 1995:01−2006:12
𝐸𝑜 1995:01−2006:12
𝑤𝑢𝑠 1995:01−2006:12
)
 
 
 
 
 =  2.27 +  1.25  𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 1995:01−2006:12)𝑡−3 − 0.15 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 1995:01−2006:12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 1995:01−2006:12 
)
𝑡−2
. 
     (8.00)∗∗∗ (14.7−)∗∗∗     (−1.62)∗∗∗ 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.79       𝐷.𝑊.= 1.49      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −1.96     𝑛 = 1995: 01 − 2006:12 
 
 
Short-term 
 
∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 1995:02−2006:12
ℎ𝑚𝑥 1995:02−2006:12
𝐸𝑜 1995:02−2006:12
𝑤𝑢𝑠 1995:02−2006:12
)
 
 
 =  0.003 + 1.12 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 1995:02−2006:12 )𝑡−3 −
0.42 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 1995:02−2006:12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 1995:02−2006:12 
)
𝑡−2
− 0.75(𝜀6)𝑡−1. 
(0.43)  (4.77)∗∗∗      (−3.70)∗∗∗      (9.51)  
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.51      𝐷.𝑊.= 2.15      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −2.10    𝑛 = 1995: 02 − 2006:12 
Note: When the error term is no significant, it means that it is no significantly different from zero. Thus, the long-term relationship established in the 
cointegration equation is in equilibrium, Kennedy (1992). 
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Long-term 
𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
ℎ𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
𝐸𝑜 2007:01−2013:02
𝑤𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
)
 
 
 
 
 =  0.02 + 0.61  𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 2007:01−2013:02 )𝑡−1 − 0.45 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02  
)  . 
     (0.04)   (4.14)∗∗∗  (−2.82)∗∗∗ 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.42       𝐷.𝑊.= 1.51      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −2.42     𝑛 = 2007: 01 − 2012:12 
Short-term 
 
∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
ℎ𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
𝐸𝑜 2007:01−2013:02
𝑤𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
)
 
 
 
 
 =  0.002 + 0.90 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 2007:01−2013:02  )𝑡−1 − 0.55 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02 
)  
          (0.26)  (3.09)∗∗∗       (−3.76)∗∗∗   
 
     −0.86(𝜀7)𝑡−1. 
 (−6.53)∗∗∗ 
 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.45      𝐷.𝑊.= 1.91      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −2.47    𝑛 = 2007: 02 − 2012:12 
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Machinery (333) 
 
Long-term 
𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 1990:01−1994:12
ℎ𝑚𝑥 1990:01−1994:12
𝐸𝑜 1990:01−1994:12
𝑤𝑢𝑠 1990:01−1994:12
)
 
 
 
 
 =  4.66 +  1.91(𝐸𝑟𝑐 1990:01−1994:12)𝑡−1 − 0.37 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 1990:01−1994:12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 1990:01−1994:12 
)
𝑡−1
 . 
      (6.37)∗∗∗ (9.02)∗∗∗  (−1.90)∗∗ 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.59       𝐷.𝑊.= 1.81      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −1.01     𝑛 = 1990: 01 − 1994:12 
Note: Values in parenthesis stand for the t-Statistics, whereby (   )*** 99% of statistical significance; (   )** 95% of statistical significance; (   )* 90% 
of statistic significance. 
Short-term 
∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 1990:02−1994:12
ℎ𝑚𝑥 1990:02−1994:12
𝐸𝑜 1990:02−1994:12
𝑤𝑢𝑠 1990:02−1994:12
)
 
 
 =  −0.003 + 3.92 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 1990:02−1994:12)𝑡−1 −
0.86 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 1990:02−1994:12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 1990:02−1994:12 
)
𝑡−2
− 1.11(𝜀8)𝑡−1. 
(−0.19)  (2.13)∗∗     (−3.71)∗∗∗     (−6.98)∗∗∗ 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.54      𝐷.𝑊.= 1.95      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −1.07   𝑛 = 1990:02 − 1994: 12 
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Long-term 
𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 1995:01−2006:12
ℎ𝑚𝑥 1995:01−2006:12
𝐸𝑜 1995:01−2006:12
𝑤𝑢𝑠 1995:01−2006:12
)
 
 
 
 
 =  2.26 +  1.26  𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 1995:01−2006:12) + 0.29 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 1995:01−2006:12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 1995:01−2006:12 
)  
     (5.10)∗∗∗ (9.84)∗∗∗    (2.41)∗∗∗ 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.58       𝐷.𝑊.= 1.47      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −0.82     𝑛 = 1995: 01 − 2006:12 
 
Short-term 
 
∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 1995:02−2006:12
ℎ𝑚𝑥 1995:02−2006:12
𝐸𝑜 1995:02−2006:12
𝑤𝑢𝑠 1995:02−2006:12
)
 
 
 =  −0.001 + 1.52∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 1995:02−2006:12 )𝑡−1 −
0.21 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 1995:02−2006:12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 1995:02−2006:12 
)
𝑡−2
− 0.84 (𝜀9)𝑡−1. 
(−0.09)  (3.22)∗∗∗       (−1.65)∗∗∗     (−9.47)  
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.42      𝐷.𝑊.= 2.01      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −0.78    𝑛 = 1995: 02 − 2006:12 
 
Note: When the error term is no significant, it means that it is no significantly different from zero. Thus, the long-term relationship established in the 
cointegration equation is in equilibrium, Kennedy (1992). 
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Long-term 
𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
ℎ𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
𝐸𝑜 2007:01−2013:02
𝑤𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
)
 
 
 
 
 =  0.87 +  0.86  𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 2007:01−2013:02 )𝑡−1 − 0.17 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02 
)  . 
     (1.69)∗∗∗  (5.58)∗∗∗  (−2.82)∗∗∗ 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.38       𝐷.𝑊.= 1.88      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −2.02     𝑛 = 2007: 01 − 2012:12 
Short-term 
 
∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
ℎ𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
𝐸𝑜 2007:01−2013:02
𝑤𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
)
 
 
 
 
 =  0.002 + 1.56 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 2007:01−2013:02  )𝑡−1 − 0.45 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02 
)  
          (0.29)  (4.44)∗∗∗       (−3.76)∗∗∗   
 
     −1.13(𝜀10)𝑡−1. 
 (−8.44)∗∗∗ 
 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.57      𝐷.𝑊.= 1.92      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −2.13    𝑛 = 2007: 02 − 2012:12 
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Transportation Equipment (336) 
 
Long-term 
𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 1990:01−1994:12
ℎ𝑚𝑥 1990:01−1994:12
𝐸𝑜 1990:01−1994:12
𝑤𝑢𝑠 1990:01−1994:12
)
 
 
 
 
 =  4.24 +  1.79(𝐸𝑟𝑐 1990:01−1994:12)𝑡−1 − 0.72 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 1990:01−1994:12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 1990:01−1994:12 
)
𝑡−1
 . 
      (5.60)∗∗∗ (8.16)∗∗∗  (−4.81)∗∗ 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.55       𝐷.𝑊.= 1.94      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −0.89     𝑛 = 1990: 01 − 1994:12 
Note: Values in parenthesis stand for the t-Statistics, whereby (   )*** 99% of statistical significance; (   )** 95% of statistical significance; (   )* 90% 
of statistic significance. 
 
Short-term 
∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 1990:02−1994:12
ℎ𝑚𝑥 1990:02−1994:12
𝐸𝑜 1990:02−1994:12
𝑤𝑢𝑠 1990:02−1994:12
)
 
 
 =  −0.01 + 3.98 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 1990:02−1994:12)𝑡−1 −
0.86 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 1990:02−1994:12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 1990:02−1994:12 
)
𝑡−2
− 1.19(𝜀11)𝑡−1. 
(−0.30)  (2.10)∗∗     (−5.63)∗∗∗     (−7.53)∗∗∗ 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.59      𝐷.𝑊.= 1.76      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −0.92   𝑛 = 1990:02 − 1994: 12 
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Long-term 
𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 1995:01−2006:12
ℎ𝑚𝑥 1995:01−2006:12
𝐸𝑜 1995:01−2006:12
𝑤𝑢𝑠 1995:01−2006:12
)
 
 
 
 
 =  5.09 +  2.08  𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 1995:01−2006:12)𝑡−1 − 0.40 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 1995:01−2006:12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 1995:01−2006:12  
)
𝑡−2
 . 
     (10.06)∗∗∗ (14.01)∗∗∗     (−4.22)∗∗∗   
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.66       𝐷.𝑊.= 1.88      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −0.75     𝑛 = 1995: 01 − 2006:12 
 
Short-term 
 
∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 1995:02−2006:12
ℎ𝑚𝑥 1995:02−2006:12
𝐸𝑜 1995:02−2006:12
𝑤𝑢𝑠 1995:02−2006:12
)
 
 
 =  5.12 + 2.09 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 1995:02−2006:12 )𝑡−1 −
0.41 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 1995:02−2006:12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 1995:02−2006:12 
)
𝑡−2
+ 0.05(𝜀12)𝑡−1. 
(9.95)  (13.81)∗∗∗      (−4.22)∗∗∗      (0.56)  
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.65      𝐷.𝑊.= 1.99      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −0.73    𝑛 = 1995: 02 − 2006:12 
 
Note: When the error term is no significant, it means that it is no significantly different from zero. Thus, the long-term relationship established in the 
cointegration equation is in equilibrium, Kennedy (1992). 
  
78 
Long-term 
𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
ℎ𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
𝐸𝑜 2007:01−2013:02
𝑤𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
)
 
 
 
 
 =  1.35 +  1.12  𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 2007:01−2013:02 )𝑡−1 − 0.33 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02 
)  . 
     (2.90)∗∗∗  (8.03)∗∗∗  (−5.82)∗∗∗ 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.56       𝐷.𝑊.= 1.78      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −2.24     𝑛 = 2007: 01 − 2012:12 
 
Short-term 
 
∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
ℎ𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
𝐸𝑜 2007:01−2013:02
𝑤𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
)
 
 
 
 
 =  0.001 + 1.27 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 2007:01−2013:02  )𝑡−1 − 0.65 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02 
)  
          (0.17)  (4.14)∗∗∗       (−7.17)∗∗∗   
 
     −1.00(𝜀13)𝑡−1. 
 (−7.72)∗∗∗ 
 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.61      𝐷.𝑊.= 2.01      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −2.37    𝑛 = 2007: 02 − 2012: 12  
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Appendix 2.1.2  
Statistics of Table 3. Manufacturing Output. Growth Rates. Selected Periods 
 
 
(
 
 
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 1987:01−1994:12  − 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥,𝑡−12,1987:01−1994:12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥,𝑡−12,1987:01−1994:12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 1987:01−1994:12  − 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠,𝑡−12,1987:01−1994:12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠,𝑡−12,1987:01−1994:12 )
 
 
= 1.32. 
 (1.83)∗∗ 
Raj
2 = 0.01         C. Akaike = 6.76    n = 1987: 01 − 1994: 12 
 
 
(
 
 
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02  − 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥,𝑡−12,2007:01−2013:02
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥,𝑡−12,2007:01−2013:02
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02  − 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠,𝑡−12,2007:01−2013:02
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠,𝑡−12,2007:01−2013:02 )
 
 
= 1.25. 
 
              (23.15)∗∗∗ 
Raj
2 = 0.01         C. Akaike = 5.28    n = 2007: 01 − 2013: 02 
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Appendix 2.2 
Statistics of Table 4. Production workers. Elasticity of Mexican hourly wage with respect of United States hourly wages, 
and Mexican real exchange rate. Monthly frequency. Selected periods 
 
Long-term 
𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 1987:01−1994:12
ℎ𝑚𝑥 1987:01−1994:12
𝐸𝑜 1987:01−1994:12 
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 1987:01−1994:12
)
 
 
 
 
 =  6.18 +  2.44 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑤𝑢𝑠 1987:01−1994:12
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 1987:01−1994:12
)  +  1.38 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 1987:01−1994:12)𝑡−1 . 
      (5.00)∗∗∗ (4.07)∗∗∗    (14.67)∗∗∗ 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.83       𝐷.𝑊.= 2.02      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −1.34    𝑛 = 1987:01 − 1994: 12 
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Short-term 
∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 1987:01−1994:12
ℎ𝑚𝑥 1987:01−1994:12
𝐸𝑜 1987:01−1994:12
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 1987:01−1994:12
)
 
 
 
 
 
= − 0.01 +  7.32 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑤𝑢𝑠 1987:01−1994:12
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 1987:01−1994:12
) +  3.82 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 1987:01−1994:12)𝑡−1 –  1.09 (𝜀4)𝑡−1. 
   (−1.19)  (5.14)∗∗∗        (4.49)∗∗∗    (−10.09)∗∗∗ 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.63      𝐷.𝑊.= 1.93      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −1.53    𝑛 = 1987: 02 − 1994:12 
 
Long-term 
𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 1995:01−2006:12
ℎ𝑚𝑥 1995:01−2006:12
𝐸𝑜 1995:01−2006:12
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 1995:01−2006:12
)
 
 
 
 
 =  2.55 +  0.88 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑤𝑢𝑠 1995:01−2006:12
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 1995:01−2006:12
) +  1.42 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 1995:01−2006:12).  
      (5.09)∗∗∗ (3.18)∗∗∗    (12.32)∗∗∗ 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.69       𝐷.𝑊.= 1.63      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −1.07    𝑛 = 1995:01 − 2006: 12 
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Short-term 
∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 1995:01−2006:12
ℎ𝑚𝑥 1995:01−2006:12
𝐸𝑜 1995:01−2006:12
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 1995:01−2006:12
)
 
 
 
 
 
=  −0.001 +  3.63 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑤𝑢𝑠 1995:01−2006:12
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 1995:01−2006:12
) +  1.66 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 1995:01−2006:12) −  0.77 (𝜀5)𝑡−1. 
   (−0.14)  (3.36)∗∗∗        (4.05)∗∗∗    (−8.52)∗∗∗ 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.48      𝐷.𝑊.= 1.96      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −1.13    𝑛 = 1995: 01 − 2006:12 
 
Long-term 
𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
ℎ𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
𝐸𝑜 2007:01−2013:02
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
)
 
 
 
 
 =  2.86 +  1.34 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑤𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
)  +  1.29 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 2007:01−2013:02). 
      (2.30)∗∗∗ (4.77)∗∗∗    (6.04)∗∗∗ 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.35       𝐷.𝑊.= 1.93      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −1.92     𝑛 = 2007: 01 − 2013:02 
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Short-term 
∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
ℎ𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
𝐸𝑜 2007:01−2013:02
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
)
 
 
 
 
 
=  0.002 +  2.63 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑤𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
)  +  1.54 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑟𝑐 2007:01−2013:02)  –  1.01 (𝜀6)𝑡−1. 
   (0.19)  (3.80)∗∗∗        (3.90)∗∗∗    (−7.98)∗∗∗ 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.55      𝐷.𝑊.= 1.91      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −1.93    𝑛 = 2007: 01 − 2013:02 
  
84 
Appendix 2.3 
Statistics of Table 5. Production workers. Elasticity of United States production and nonsupervisory employees, with 
respect to United States and Mexican hourly wages. Monthly frequency. Selected periods.  
 
Long-term 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐿𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02)  =  9.61 − 0.88 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02 
) −  0.59 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑤𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
)  
     (19.51)∗∗∗   (−6.72)∗∗∗  (−6.07)∗∗∗ 
 + 0.37 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
ℎ𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
𝐸𝑜 2007:01−2013:02
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
)
 
 
 +0.03 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
ℎ𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
𝐸𝑜 2007:01−2013:02
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
)
 
 
∗ 𝐷. 
    (3.25)∗∗∗                             (−6.72)∗∗∗ 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.78       𝐷.𝑊.= 1.06      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −3.48     𝑛 = 2007: 01 − 2013:02 
Note: D stands for a December dummy variable. 
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Short-term 
∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐿𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02)  =  −0.001 − 0.05∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02 
) −  0.14 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑤𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
)  
     (−1.69)∗∗ (−2.45)∗∗∗     (−2.80)∗∗∗  
 
+ 0.04 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
ℎ𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
𝐸𝑜 2007:01−2013:02
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
)
 
 
 
 
− 0.04 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
ℎ𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
𝐸𝑜 2007:01−2013:02
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
)
 
 
 
 
∗ 𝐷 –  0.07 (𝜀7)𝑡−1. 
   (4.38)∗∗∗                                  (−3.41)∗∗∗                     (−3.08)∗∗∗ 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.45       𝐷.𝑊.= 0.93      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −7.22     𝑛 = 2007: 01 − 2013:02 
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Appendix 2.4 
Statistics of Table 6. Production workers. Elasticity of United States wage bill with respect to hourly wages and 
manufacturing production index of United States and Mexican hourly wages. Monthly frequency. Selected periods 
 
Long-term 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑊𝑢𝑠 1987:01−1994:12
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 1987:01−1994:12
)  =  10.89 +  0.58 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑤𝑢𝑠 1987:01−1994:12
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 1987:01−1994:12
)  +  0.24 𝑙𝑜𝑔  (𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 1987:01−1994:12)𝑡−1  
     (20.97)∗∗∗       (2.53)∗∗∗      (1.78)∗∗                
 
− 0.07 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 1987:01−1994:12
ℎ𝑚𝑥 1987:01−1994:12
𝐸𝑜 1987:01−1994:12
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 1987:01−1994:12
)
 
 
 
 
. 
        (−2.99)∗∗∗ 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.12       𝐷.𝑊.= 0.98      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −4.37     𝑛 = 1987: 01 − 1994:12 
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Short-term 
∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑊𝑢𝑠 1987:01−1994:12
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 1987:01−1994:12
)  =  − 0.0009 +  0.62 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑤𝑢𝑠 1987:01−1994:12
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 1987:01−1994:12
)   
        (−0.54)  (2.52)∗∗∗        
+ 0.18 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 1987:01−1994:12)𝑡−1 +  0.03 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 1987:01−1994:12
ℎ𝑚𝑥 1987:01−1994:12
𝐸𝑜1987:01−1994:12
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 1987:01−1994:12
)
 
 
 
 
−  0.26 (𝜀8)𝑡−1. 
     (2.27)∗∗∗       (2.87)∗∗∗    (−3.14)∗∗∗   
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.50      𝐷.𝑊.= 2.02      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −5.58    𝑛 = 1987: 01 − 1994:12 
Long-term 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑊𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
)  =  10.23 +  1.90 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑤𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
) + + 1.16 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2012:10)   
     (23.99)∗∗∗ (10.60)∗∗∗     (13.70)∗∗∗ 
0.14 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
ℎ𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
𝐸𝑜 2007:01−2013:02
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
)
 
 
 
 
. 
 (3.30)∗∗∗       
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.82       𝐷.𝑊.= 0.44      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −3.67     𝑛 = 2007: 01 − 2013:02 
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Short-term 
∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑊𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
 )  =  −0.002 +  0.97 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑤𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
) +  0.47 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔  (𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2012:10)  
       (−2.09)∗∗ (9.47)∗∗∗            (10.16)∗∗∗        
+ 0.05 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔
(
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
ℎ𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02
𝐸𝑜 2007:01−2013:02
𝑝𝑓𝑔𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02
)
 
 
 
 
 −  0.10(𝜀9)𝑡−1. 
   (7.23)∗∗∗            (−2.82)∗∗∗ 
𝑅𝑎𝑗
2 = 0.78      𝐷.𝑊.= 1.14      𝐶. 𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 = −6.71    𝑛 = 2007: 01 − 2013:02 
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APPENDIX 3.  
Equation (2): Unit Root Test  
Variable Test Lags Critical 
values* 
Significance t-Statistic Include 
in 
test*** 
 
(
 
 
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 1987:01−1994:12  − 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥,𝑡−12,1987:01−1994:12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥,𝑡−12,1987:01−1994:12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 1987:01−1994:12  − 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠,𝑡−12,1987:01−1994:12
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠,𝑡−12,1987:01−1994:12 )
 
 
 
ADF** 0 -3.524233 1% level -10.51325 A 
   -2.902358 5% level -10.43851 B 
   -2.588587 10% level -8.961166 C 
       
(
 
 
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥 2007:01−2013:02  − 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥,𝑡−12,2007:01−2013:02
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑥,𝑡−12,2007:01−2013:02
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠 2007:01−2013:02  − 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠,𝑡−12,2007:01−2013:02
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑠,𝑡−12,2007:01−2013:02 )
 
 
 
ADF** 0 -3.544063 1% level -9.797599 A 
   -2.910860 5% level -7.172170 B 
   -2.593090 10% level -7.236434 C 
* MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values, for rejecting the Null Hypothesis of having a unit root;  
** ADF Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. Critical values for 1% level, 5% level, 10% level of confidence interval;  
*** Include in the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test equation: A intercept, B trend and intercept, C none; 
Source: independent variables of Appendix 2.1.2 equations. 
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APPENDIX 4. 
Equation (2): Serial Correlation Test 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test 
 
Equation (2) 1987:01-1994:12 
F-statistic   2.150285  Prob. F(2,69)   0.1242 
 
 
Equation (2) 2007:01-2013:02 
F-statistic   2.366582  Prob. F(2,57)   0.1030 
Source: independent variables of Appendix 2.1.2 equations. 
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APPENDIX 5.  
Residuals of cointegrating equations. Unit Root Test 
Variable Test Lags* Critical 
values** 
Significance t-Statistic  Include in 
test*** 
 
𝜀1 ADF 11 -3.510259 1% level -1.846681 A 
   -2.896346 5% level -3.199410 B 
   -2.585396 10% level -1.739780 C 
       
𝜀2 ADF 10 -3.54610 1% level -8.473341 A 
   -2.91173 5% level -8.399889 B 
   -2.593551 10% level -8.556128 C 
       
𝜀3 PP 4 -3.476472 1% level -4.150813 A 
   -2.881685 5% level -5.918563 B 
   -2.577591 10% level -4.232146 C 
       
𝜀4 PP 3 -3.525618 1% level -8.243288 A 
   -2.902953 5% level -8.210842 B 
   -2.588902 10% level -8.320128 C 
       
𝜀5 ADF 10 -3.54610 1% level -7.514899 A 
   -2.91173 5% level -7.515014 B 
   -2.593551 10% level -7.581756 C 
       
𝜀6 PP 7 -3.476472 1% level -9.994172 A 
   -2.881685 5% level -10.38461 B 
   -2.577591 10% level -10.02005 C 
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   APPENDIX 5.  (continues)   
       
Residuals of cointegrating equations. Unit Root Test 
Variable Test Lags* Critical 
values** 
Significance t-Statistic  Include in 
test*** 
 
       
𝜀7 ADF 11 -3.525618 1% level -6.595172 A 
   -2.902953 5% level -7.282937 B 
   -2.588902 10% level -6.653905 C 
       
𝜀8 ADF 10 -3.54610 1% level -6.814311 A 
   -2.91173 5% level -6.745694 B 
   -2.593551 10% level -6.89121 C 
       
𝜀9 PP 7 -3.476472 1% level -9.871799 A 
   -2.881685 5% level -10.18885 B 
   -2.577591 10% level -9.898504 C 
       
𝜀10 PP 13 -3.525618 1% level -8.516532 A 
   -2.902953 5% level -8.45279 B 
   -2.588902 10% level -8.634194 C 
       
𝜀11 ADF 10 -3.54610 1% level -7.454336 A 
   -2.91173 5% level -7.471276 B 
   -2.593551 10% level -7.540834 C 
       
𝜀12 PP 5 -3.476472 1% level -11.43275 A 
   -2.881685 5% level -12.14142 B 
   -2.577591 10% level -11.46746 C 
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   APPENDIX 5.  (continues)   
       
Residuals of cointegrating equations. Unit Root Test 
Variable Test Lags* Critical 
values** 
Significance t-Statistic  Include in 
test*** 
 
𝜀13 ADF 11 -3.525618 1% level -7.381388 A 
   -2.902953 5% level 0.664294 B 
   -2.588902 10% level -7.446109 C 
       
𝜀14 PP 5 -3.500669 1% level -9.830433 A 
   -2.892200 5% level -9.756124 B 
   -2.583192 10% level -9.898763 C 
       
𝜀15 PP 6 -3.476472 1% level -10.38376 A 
   -2.881685 5% level -10.92626 B 
   -2.577591 10% level -10.41507 C 
       
𝜀16 ADF 11 -3.525618 1% level -8.093557 A 
   -2.902953 5% level -8.272264 B 
   -2.588902 10% level -8.160548 C 
       
𝜀17 ADF 0 -3.527045 1% level -5.132278 A 
   -2.903566 5% level -5.206263 B 
   -2.589227 10% level -5.167852 C 
       
𝜀18 ADF 0 -3.540198 1% level -4.430112 A 
   -2.909206 5% level -5.155882 B 
   -2.592215 10% level -4.466561 C 
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* MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values, for rejecting the Null Hypothesis of having a unit root; 
** Critical values for 1% level, 5% level, 10% level of confidence interval; 
*** Include in the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test equation: A intercept; B trend and intercept and C none; 
ADF stands for Augmented Dickey-Fuller test;  
PP stands for Phillips-Perron test. 
Note: all the residuals from 1 to 19 are integrated of order cero I(0). 
Source: residuals from the long-term estimated equations reported in Appendix 2.1; 2.2; 2.3 and 2.4. 
 
   APPENDIX 5.  (continues)   
       
Residuals of cointegrating equations. Unit Root Test 
Variable Test Lags* Critical 
values** 
Significance t-Statistic  Include in 
test*** 
 
𝜀19 ADF 10 -3.524233 1% level -2.736048 A 
   -2.902358 5% level -3.489230 B 
   -2.588587 10% level -2.763503 C 
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APPENDIX 6.  
129 primary industrial activities. Correspondence throughout time 
The primary industrial activities for Mexican manufacturing are available for four 
overlapped periods, i.e. first period 1987-1995; a second period: 1994-2008; a third 
period 2005-2010 and fourth period 2007-up to date. The four periods have a 
monthly frequency. These four periods are based on various industrial 
classifications and different number of primary industrial activities.  
 
The first period, i.e. 1987-1995 is based on the Catalogo Mexicano de Actividades 
Economicas (CMAE) or Mexican Catalog of Economic Activities, with four digits as 
a system of classification for the original 129 primary industrial activities. The 
second period 1994-2008 used the Clasificacion Mexicana de Actividades y 
Productos (CMAP 1994) or Mexican Classification of Activities and Products, with 
six digits as a system of classification for 205 primary industrial activities. The third 
period 2005-2010 used the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS 
2002), with at least six digits for its classification system for 230 primary industrial 
activities. The fourth period 2007-up to date uses the North American Industry 
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Classification System (NAICS 2007), at least six digits are used in this system for 
the classification of 240 primary industrial activities.  
 
In order to obtain continuous periods of time, i.e. not overlapped, it was necessary 
to obtain consistency in the number of primary business activities throughout time. 
This is achieved by performing a match of the original 129 primary industrial 
activities which compose in its entirety the first period (1987-1994), with the 
following periods: 1994-2008 and 2009-up to date. In order to match the original 
129 primary business activities with the following industrial activities throughout 
time (four digits), the next correspondence tables were used: CMAE-CMAP 1994 
(from the first period to the second, that is to say, from the original four digits to 
six); CMAP 1994-SCIAN 2002 (from the second period to the third, that is to say, 
from 6 digits to 6 digits) and SCIAN 2002-SCIAN 2007 (from the third period to the 
fourth, from 6 digits to 6 digits).  
 
Systematically, the source for linking the original 129 primary industrial activities 
with the subsequent periods has been the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y 
Geografia (INEGI) or National Institute of Statistics and Geography, Encuesta 
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Industrial Mensual or Monthly Industrial Survey. The first correspondence table 
used is available upon request. The rest of correspondence tables are available on 
line.56 
 
The above matching exercise is not required for United States case. This is due to 
several reasons. First, the United States Census Bureau reviews every five years 
the NAICS in order to keep pace with changes in the economy. Second, the United 
States census maintains and assigns only one NAICS code for each establishment 
based on its primary industry activity. 57  Third, the manufacturing information 
provided by the United States Census Bureau is continuous through time. Fourth, 
the available data is not overlapped. These four reasons made unnecessary 
applying to United States manufacturing survey data a process like the one above 
mentioned for the Mexican case.  
 
                                               
56 Information available in the INEGI web page. The specific links are listed in the references.  
57 Information available in United States Census Bureau web page. 
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APPENDIX 7.  
Mexico and United States Inflation and Peso Exchange Rate 
It should be noted that Mexico exposes a long-term price instability. For the period 
of 1987-2013 and considering for both countries 2013 as a basis, the United States 
exposed an average of 48.3 in 1987, doubling within this period. Meanwhile, 
Mexico climbed from an average of 2.3 in the same year, up to more than 26 
times.58 
 
 
                                               
58 It should be conceded that after 1996, inflation has receded. 
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Figure	2.	United	States	and	Mexico.	Consumer	Price	Index*		
1987:01-2013:12	(2013=100	)	
United	States	 Mexico	
Source: Own estimates based on Banco de Mexico and Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
*	All	urban	consumers,	not	seasonally	adjusted,	for	the	United	States.	For	Mexico,	Na onal	Consumer	Price	Index.		
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The loss of purchasing power for the Mexican peso during the period referred 
previously has had its counterpart through the devaluation of the Mexican currency 
during the same period. In January, 1987, for instance, exchange rate was at 978 
pesos per dollar. In January 1993, the unit of account was modified, whereby three 
zeros were removed from the currency i.e., old pesos. The “new” peso was 
equivalent to a thousand of the old peso. Considering the current unit of account, 
the exchange rate at the beginning of 1987 was at 0.978 pesos per dollar. By the 
end of 2013, it had reached over 13 pesos per dollar, as shown in Figure 3. That is 
to say, the peso has devalued during the period under analysis, by over 1,300 
percent, in turn, reflecting the local inflation prevalent in Mexico. 
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During these periods there are two main devaluation episodes. Following Mexico 
entrance to NAFTA, a considerable devaluation took effect, as the peso devalued 
100% from 3.5 to the dollar by the end of 1994.This had to do with the heavy 
indebtedness of the Mexican economy after several years of enduring considerable 
current account deficits including public indebtedness. Although Mexico was the 
first country to show the entailed feebleness, this event affected various Latin 
American countries, basically for the same reason, better known as the Tequila 
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Figure	3.	Mexico.	Exchange	Rate.	1987:01-2013:12	(Pesos	per	Dollar)	
Source: Banco de Mexico. 
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Effect. The second episode is connected with the last world recession, by the end 
of 2008, when the currency rose from 10 to 12 pesos per dollar.  
 
 
 
The real exchange rate59 and the wage gap move alongside. At first sight, the 
movements of both variables seem to be parallel. In addition to this, during the 
periods under which the Mexican peso has been undervalued, i.e. 1995 and 2009, 
                                               
59 “The real exchange rate between two countries may be defined as the relative price of one 
country’s consumption basket in terms of the consumption basket of the other country.” Mussa 
(1986). 
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Figure	4.	United	States-Mexico	Manufacturing	Produc on	Workers	Wage	Gap	and	
Mexico-United	States	Bilateral	Real	Exchange	Rate.	1987:01-2013:12		
(Dollars	and	2013=100)	
1987:01-1994:12	 1995:01-2006:12	 2007:01-2013:12	 Er	
Source: Own estimates based on Banco de Mexico, Bureau of Labor Statistics and Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia. 
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the wage gap increases. As an illustration of this increase, the end of 1994 this gap 
register a value close to 0.17, while at the beginning of 1995 just after the Tequila 
crisis took place and the peso loss value, it registered a value around 0.09. This 
same pattern is also followed during the 2009 world crisis. 
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